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The written testimony which was submitted for the 
November 5, 1985 hearing of the Senate Select Committee on 
Drug and Alcohol Abuse is attached. Due to technical 
difficulties with the recording equipment, it is unfortunate 
that we are unable to provide you with the actual transcript 
of the hearing. 
Should you desire further information relative to a 
particular individual's testimony, ! . have included a list of 
addresses of those who testified at the hearing. I hope 
that this list, in combination with the written materials 
which were submitted, provides you with an adequate overview 
of the clandestine lab and.designer drug problem. 
Thank you for your interest in this very important 
problem. 
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MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE~ THANK YOU 
FOR · THLS OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY ON THE PRODUCTION OF ~LLEGAL 
DRUGS PJ CALIFOHNIA. CLANDESTINE LABS ARE ALREADY TqE NOST 
SERIOUS DRUG PROBLEM IN THIS STATE. AND THE PROBLEM IS GETTING 
WORf.f~: BY THE Dft:Y. 
HISTORICALLY, CALIFORNIA HAS BEEN EASY PREY TO DRUGS 
T .. I.Kfo: IIEHOIN, COCAINE, AND i1ARIJUAl~A THAT FLOH EAS.ILY li.CR03S OUR 
BORD8RS. WITHIN THE PAST DECADE, HOWEVER, A NEW AND OMINOUS 
TREND liAS gr·1EHGF.D. ChLIFORNIA liAS. BECOME A MlhlOR SOURCE S.TA~rE 
"FOH 'rim -PRODUCTION OF If .. f .. EGAL DRUGS. 
DOMESTIC PR8DUC'l'ION OF MARIJUANA BAS DRAv,lN THE MOST 
ATTENTION WrTHIN THE STATE. THE DIVERSION AND ABUSE OF 
PIU~SCRII; TION DRUGS IS EQUALf .. Y SERIOUS, THOuG~l LESS \'JELL 
PUBLICIZim.;. BU'l' PERHAPS 'l'HI:: MOST SERIOUS PROBLEl-1 OI•' ALL IS TBE 
CLANDL·:S'J'INE MANUFACTURE 0~' P.C.P., L.S.D., ME'1'HAt-1l>HETAl>1INE AND ., 
MORE fmCC:NTLY, TilE \\IHOLg Pl1.NOPLY OF SYNTHETIC NP.RCO'l'ICS KNO\'lN 
AS "DESIGNER DRUGS." 
'l'r~N YE.Z\RS AGO OUH CLANDES'fiNE LABORATORY PIWBLEM 'ilAS 
RET~J\'l~lVELY. MOD·gST. BUT :r.•r HAS l3l~EN GRONING AT A FEARSOME 
RJ\'l'g. · f'OH. 'rHE PAST 'f~'/0 ygARS, CT\LIPORNIA HAS r .. rm 'fHE NATION IN 
'fill:: l1J\NlJli'AC'l'URE Of' rr.r .. ICIT NARCOTICS. ACCO~WING 'fO 'fHE U.S. 
DHLJ~; ENI"ORCEMI:~NT Al1l'\INJ.STH.I\'l'ION, 312 CT...J\NDgSTINE LABORATORH~S 
Nl·:Rg SBJZED N/\'l'ION\-JlJ)g IN 1984. orm HUNDIU:O OF THOSE, NEARLY 
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ONE-THIRD OF THE TOTAL, WERE SEIZED RIGIIT HERE IN CALIFORNIA. ,, 
AND, IN TRUTH, THE SITUATION IS MUCH WORSE THAN THOSE 
NUMHERS SUGGES'f. ONE OF THE tt'RUSTRA'fiONS OF FIGHTING 
CLANDESTINE LARS IS THRLACK OF RELIABLE DATA. LEGISLATION THAT 
I SPONSORED LAST YEAR WILL EVENTUALLY SOLVE THAT PROBLEM. BUT 
FOR NOW WE ARE GROPING IN THE STATISTICAL DARK. 
CON'l'RAST, f.<'OR EXAMPLE 1 THE 100 LAR SEIZURES REPORTED 
TO TilE D.E.A. LAST YEAR WI'l'H THE RESUL'fS OF A POf,fJ OF FIVE 
MAJOR FOrU:NSIC LABORA'rORIES AROUND Tl·m S'fATf~: THEY 'REPORT F:D 183 
LABS SEIZED AND ANALYZED IN CALIFORNIA LAST YEAR~ AND 222 MORE 
SO FAR THIS YEAR. 
EVEN THOSE NUMBERS PROBABLY SUBSTANTIALfJY UNDE1{C0UNT 
'l'O'rAL SEit:lJRgE. AND FOR EVERY LAB \-m F'IND, 'l'HERE ARF.: /\'£ LEAS'!' 
THREE THAT WE MISS. 
AS THIS CHAHT INDICA'fi!:S 1 E1\CH ONE OF TllESg HUNOHE:DS 0~' 
f,ABf~ IS CAPABLE Of•' CHURNING OUT AN IN2REDIBLE VO!JLIME Of 
NARCOTIC!:i o 
13EGINNING IHTH A BARRgL OF EPHEDRINE l'JEIGHHJG 
]10 POUNDS AND COSTING hBOUT $17 1 000 A TYPICAL LAB CAN "COOK" 
ABOUT 100 POUNDS OF PURE NE:'rHAMPHE'rAr1INi~ OVER Till~ COURSl<: OJ? f.·, 
MONTH. THIS IN TU1{N C/\N BE "CUT" INTO 400 POUNDS OF THE 
s ·rREE'f-S'l'RENG'fB DHUG -- ABOUT 200,000 GRAMS. AT ROUGHLY $60 A 
GRMl I'l' \WUfJD BE ~JO!t'l'H $12 MILLION. 
[,ABS COME IN .\[~L DI FF8Rf~NT SIZES. BUT l.''HOt1 TlilS 
EXAMPLE, \~IIICll IS DY NO !•mANS ATYPICAf .. 1 YOU Cl~N SEE THAT MORE 
'l'HAN T\~0 Mir .. f,lON DOSES OL~ "SPEED 11 \'JOR'N! ovgR $lAO MILLION COUI,D 
ROLL OtJ'I' OL;- A f'INGLE [Jl\DORATO~~y IN A SlNG£,E YEAR. WITH TIIAT 
KIND OF 1'-lONlW J\ND 'l'IIA'r KlND OF VOLU!·\E, YOU BEGI~'J TO Gl~'l' A S~Nsg 
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OF . WHAT w~ - rRE UP AGAINST HERE~ 
I 
AS lF THAT WEREN 1 T DAD ENOUGH, THE LAB PROBLEM IS 
'i'AKitl~; 'A Q!JAN'l'Ur1 LEAP IN SOPHISTICATION Mm DANGER WITH '.rHE NEW 
CHlmiCAL •.rgCEJNOLOGY OF SO-CALLED "DESIGNER DRUGS • . " 
GETTING 200,000 DOSES OF "SPEED" FROM 100 POUNDS OF 
PU Rg MB'l'llAMPHE'rAMINE IS PENNY AN'rE S'.rUFF IN THE \~ORLD OF 
Dt-~SIGNrm DRUGS. A SINGLE TE.ASPOON 01:' PURE SYNTHE'.riC HE ROil~ 
WILL YIELD UP TO TWO MILLION DOSES. 
• MANUFACTURING TH~SE DRUGS IS NOT ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT 
FROM ~COOkiNG" P.C.P., METHAMPHBTA~INE AND OTHER SUUSTANC~S 
CUilRENTLY ~BING MASS PRODUCED IN CALIFO~NIA LABORATORIES. THE . . . . . 
Ol~LY Rgl\L . DIF.FICU[,TY. IS THAT EVEN TINY ERRORS IN ".CUTTI·NG" 
TliF: S t:: ' P0\'1E£U;'UL C01.'1POUNOS C.l\N t-1EAN DEATH BY OVERDOSE. MOJ1.F: 'l'HJ\N 
·A · HUNDnGD CALIFORNIANS HAVE ALREADY DIEO AS A RESULT. AND 
lWNilHEDS f110fH-~ Hl\VE SUFFERED PERM!I.NEN'l' BRAIN DAr-1AGI.:~. 
OCSPITg TUE DANGERS, . H0\'1EVER 1 IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF 
TIME UEPORE THg T~CHNOLOGY BECOMES WIDESPREAD AND CALIFORNIA IS 
I!'LOOIH~D Hl 'fll SYNTHE'l'IC HEROIN. 
THA'r OPENS liP SOME 'l'gRRI~'YING VIS'rAS. HEROIN HlPOR'J'S 
FROM MEXiCO &ND TURKEY, FOR ~XAMPhE, MAY BECOME MATTERS OF 
. INTEREST ONLY TO HISTORIANS. HOMEMADE · PRODUCTION WILL DWARF 
'!'liE HlPOfi'l'S. AND !H:ROIN COULD B·ECOME AS CHEAP -AND RF.ADH,Y 
AVAlLAnLE.AS CA~DY. 
I SUPPOS~ THIS WILL -ALL bE VERY GOOD FOR OUR DALANCE 
01" P/\YM8N'1'Ei. BUT I'l' HILL BE A CA'.rAS1'ROPUE FOR OUR WAY OF 
SO WI.:'; llAVl!: A PROJlL~~M, A VERY sgRIOUS PROBLEM! GE'l"l'ING 
~WRSI~ IIY 'riJF! DAY, . AND ON '.rl!l.~! VERGE OF A QUANTm1· LI':/\P INTO 1\ . 
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TRULY DISASTROUS SITUATION. THE QUESTION NOW IS WHAT CAN WE 
I • 
DO? 
WHEN MOST DRUGS WERE IMPORTED IT WAS TRADTIONALLY A 
l''EDEHJ\L RESPONS HH J, I'l.'Y TO FIGHT THEM A'l.' TIIEIJ~ SOURCES. . THAT IS 
NO LONGEH 'l'RUE. '1.'111-.: f1AtHWJ\CTURE CW DRUGS IN Cl,ANDESTINI:': [,J\BS 
TAK8S PLACE ALMOST ENTIRELY WITHIN OUR OWN BORDERS. THE 
E-'IWfmAI. C;QVEHNMEN'f CAN AND tHLL HELP US. BUT WE MUST FIND A 
WAY TO ATTACK IT WITH STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES. 
NOR CAN WE RXPEC~ LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TO SHOULDER 
TilE nORDEN. FIRST OF ALL, LOCAL AUTHORITIES HAVE TRADITlONALLY 
FOCUSED m1 CON'rROLLING STHECT-I,EVEL DEAT~ING IN 'l'I!EIR OI~N· 
JURISDIC'flONS. AND 'i'IIEY !lAVE THEIR HANDS FUI,L A'f THAT LEVEL. 
TllERE IS Ll'l'TLE TO SP/'"RE IN THE ~'lAY OF 1"1ANPOWER 1\ND RESOURCES 
J;-OH BUS'l' JIJG LABS. 
SECONDLY 1 DEALING WI'l'tl CLhlWESTilH~ L.Z\BORATORIES IS 
VERY COriPLICATED AND DANG!~HOUS WORK. IT IS NOT 'l~O BE ATTeMPTED 
LIGHTI,Y ··- AND NCVER BY PmXPERIENCED Ol~ UN'rRAINED POLICE 
OFL''ICEHS. EVEN HALKING IN'l'O A DESER'l'ED r~ABORA'rORY -- MUCH LESS 
ATTACKING A HEAVILY DEF~NUED ONE -- RISKS EXPLOSION AND RCLEASE 
OJ.o' DEADLY •roXtNS. AND BVEI~ AF'rER A LAB HAS BEI~t·i SEIZED, 
CJ .. El\NING UP '1'1!1:: SI'l'E AtW SECURING THE EVIDENCE ARE 
EXTRAORDINARILY DI~fiCULT AND DANGEROUS. 
'rHE T~li\Bif, I'rY H1Pf,IC/\'l'IONS ALONE ARE HIND-BOGGLING FOR 
LOCAL AU'rllORI'.!.' lES -- 110'1'11 FHm1 DANGER '1'0 SUHROLJNDING HOME:S AND 
CI'fiZI~NS, AND l"ROM Di\'t~GI~~R 'l'O Ll\W ENFORCEI.'Jc-:N•r EMPLOYEES. 
EVEN 'l'lm [,1\H.CES'r POLICE IJEPAR'rr-JEN'l'S NEED SPi'~CIJ\LT .. Y 
TRAINED SQUADS ~OR THIS KIND OF WORK. SMALL ONES CANNOT DO IT 
A'f ALr~. 
-4-
BUT THE MAIN REASON THAT LOCAL JURISDICTIONS CANNOT 
,· . 
EFFECTVELY CONTROL CLANDESTINE LABS IS THAT THE PROBLEM 
ROUTINELY CROSSES JURISDICTIONAL LINES. 
. . 
ON THIS MAP WE'VE MARKED THE LOCATIONS AND THE 
"PRODUCTS OF CLANDESTINE LABORATORISS SEIZED IN CALIFORNIA IN . 
1984. YOU WILL NOTICE THAT THERE ARE SOME INTERESTING REGIONAL 
VARIATIONS. THE MANUFACTURE OF P.C.P. IS COMMON IN THE SOUTH, . . 
PARTICULARLY IN LOS ANGELES COUNT~, _BUT VIRTUALLY bNKNOWN IN 
THE NORTH. Ml~THAI'1PH~TAMINE 1 ON THE OTHER HA.ND 1 IS MOR~ 
COMMONLY P~ODUGBD NORTH OF THE TEHACHIPIS. 
NOTIC~, TOO, THAT ~HE MANUFACTURING SITES ARE SPREAD 
RATHER EVKNLY AROUND THE STATE. T~ERR A~E A NUMBER IN . 
Sl\N DIEGO, LOS ANGr~LES AND THE BAY AREA, BUT MORE ARE LOCATED 
IN TilE RURAL COUNTIES SURROUNDING TilE HETROPOLITAN AREAS. 
THERE'S -NO MYSTERY AS TO NHY THIS IS SO. THE LABS ARE 
CLOSE TO METRbPLITAN AREAS B6CAUSE THAT'S WHERE THEY GET THEIR 
SUPPT~IES AND SHIP THE~R FINISHED PRODUCTS. BUT 'rHEY PREFE:R 
. RUR/\L AREAS BECAUSE LABORATORY SMELLS, CUSTOMER COMINGS AND 
. . 
GOINGS, AND OCCASIONAL EXPLOSIONS ARE LESS LIKELY TO -DRAW 
ATTENTION THERE TKAN IN THE MIDDLE OF DENSELY POPULATED URBAN 
~I!:IGHDORHOODS. 
AND -BECAUSE LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES ARE USUALLY· 
S'l'RF.'l'C.IlF.D VERY Til IN IN RURAfJ AREAS 1 THE CHANCES OF POLICE 
INTElU'ElU!:NCE ARE . MUCH LOWER THAN ~N TH 8 CIT·Y. 
SO THE r~OCATION OF .TilE LABS THEMSELVES IS NOT REALLY A 
GOOD INDICATION OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PROBLEM. MORE 
INS'rRUC'riVE IS WHAT HAPPENS '1'0 Tlll~ DRUGS AFTER 'l'HJ:;Y [,EAVE TilE 
LABS. WHEN NE CHART 'rHAT, ~·m SI'~E. 'rliAT NO f1ATTER WHERg THE I.ABS 
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ARE LOCA'rED, '!'HEIR Sll I PPING LINES LEf\D STRAIGHT TO '£HE BAY 
AREA, SACRAMENTO, FRESNO, LOS ANGELES OR SAN DIEGO. EACH CITY 
IS RINGf;J) WI'rll ITS OWN LI'l"l'LB CIRCLE OF HIGH VOr,ur-m POISON 
DI SPlmSJmS. 
AND THERE 1 S ANO'l'HER PART OF THE PIC'I'URE TO CONSIDER: 
THE FLm-J 01:, PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. MANY OF 'rHE CHEMICALS USED TO 
MANUFJ\C'l' IJRE NAHCOTICS ARE COMHON. MOST HAVE r.EGI'riMA'l'E 
INDUS'fRIAL USES. VIR'rUALf,Y ALL ARE PRODUCED IN URBAN AREAS. 
NO'l' SURPRISINGI.Y, \•JHEN HE CHART TilE FL0\'1 OF PRECURSOR CHEMICALS 
WE SSF: TIIA'l' THE TRAFFIC IS ONE-\-JAY FROM 'l'HE CITIES, AND 
PARTICULARLY FROM THE BAY AREA, TO THE RURAL COUNTIES. 
CLEARLY 'J.'IJ IS IS A PROBLEI'-1 THAT EXT ENDS F/\R BEYOND 'I' liE 
REACH OF ANY LOCAL JURISDICTION. IT IS AN ENDLESS CYCLE FROM 
UIWJ\N CHE1'1ICAL Pf.ANTS 'fO RURAL Ll\T30RA'l'OIHES AND 0/\CK '1'0 URBM,1 
DRUG MARKETS -- A DEADLY, EFFICIENT AND LUCRATIVE DISTRIBUTION 
SYS'l'E 1 THA'l' I~EAVgs NO NEIGIJnORHOOD IN 'filE S'I'A'_rE UNTOUCHED. 
OUR ONLY HOPB FOR GETTING A HANDLE ON CLANDESTINE L/\BS 
IS /\ S~RONG, COOPERATIVE EFFORT AMONG ALL LEVELS OF LAW 
rmFORCEM£~N'l'. AND IT IS QUITE CLRAR THAT 'l'i-IE I<;Fr,ORT HUST BE 
COO lWlHA'fED AT THE S'fA'rE Ll::VEL. 
'rllgRE ARE A NUMi3ER Of:' 'l'IIINGS THAT \'IE CAN DO A'f THE 
STAT~ LEVEL, AND I WANT TO DEAL WITH THEM IN SOME DETAIL. BUT 
LET ~1E S'rRESS RIGHT UP FRONT THAT THEim ARE NO EASY OR 
INEXPENSIVE ANSWERS. WB CANNOT SOLVE TillS PROBLEM SIMPLY BY 
PASSING SOr-11~: NgW LA\~S. \~E. 1 RI:": GOING TO JlAVf~ '1'0 SQ[,Vf!: IT· BY 
PU'r'riNG ~101{8 ~10NEY INTO DRUG ENFOH.CEMI~ N ·r. 
Lg•r ~IE GIVE. YOU AN EX1\MPI.E. CA[,II.-'ORNIA liAS TilE f\ES'r 
PRECURSOH CON'l'l{()f, £,1\\•J.::i HI 'l'lll~ COUN'l'RY. OUR LAW HEUlliHES 
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CHEMICA[, WHOLESALf~RS •ro REPORT TO 'fH~ · DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ALL 
SALES OF SPECIFIC PRECURSORS. FAILURE TO REPORT RESULTS IN 
CRIMINAL PENALTIES. 
AND, WITH SOME . NOTABLE . EXC8PTIONS, THE CHEMICAL 
INDUSTRY HAS BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE. SOME COMPANIES HAVE SIMPLY 
CI~ASED Ml,NUFACTURING CF,:RTAIN CONTROLLED CHEI'HCALS WITH A HIGH 
POTENTIAL FOR USE IN CLANDESTINE DRUG LABS. 
IN OTHER CASES 1 ·IT, LEGAL LABS I·IAVE BEEN . FORCED TO 
. 
IHPOH'I~ CHEI"liCALS. FR0!-1 O'rHER STAT·ES WHICH HAVE NOT HAD A 
PRECURSOR ~EPORTING S1STEM. PRECURSOR CONTROL ~AS PROVEN 
ITSELF A VALUABLE DETERRENT. 
YET WE ARE USING THIS TOOL TO ONLY A FRACTION OF ITS 
POTgN'l'IJ\L. NI.TlJ OVER 2, 000 CHEMICAL WHOL ESI\I,.f.n~s AND RETAILERS 
IN 'l'HI~ S'l~ATE ~<IE RECEIVED ONLY 200 REPOR'l'S ON PRECURSOR 
CIIEMICALS LAST YEAR. AND THOSE REPORTS WE DID .RECEIVE COULD 
NO'f rm fl.NALYZIW. YE'l' ,EXPERIENCE liAS SHO\'lN THAT CAREFUL 
ANALYSIS WOULD PAY OFF HIG IN GOOD LEADS AND, ULTIMA~ELY, IN 
LAR SIUZURES. 
WHY ARE WE OPERATING THIS WAY? THg ANSWER IS 
. ' 
PAINFULLY SIMPLE. WITH EXISTING MANPOWER, WE CAN INVESTIGATE 
[,ESS '!'111\N ONE-FOURTH OF THE GOOD LEADS WE HAVE NOW .. ~10RE. 
REPOR'l'S AND BL~·r•rgR ANALYSI.S WOULD ONLY PRODUCE MORE LEADS TliA'l' 
\'m COlH .. D NOT FQl',LO\A7 UP. SO WE HAVE BAD TO FACE THE UNPLEASANT 
CHOICE OF PUTTING MORE M1\NPOW8R INTO ENFORCEMENT AND LEgs INTO 
PRECURSOR CONTROL. 
TWO Yl!!ARS AGO, REA'f,IZING 'l'HAT \olE FACED A GRO\\'ING 
L1\nORA'l'ORY PROI3L EM IN C i\I, I '1:-'0RNIA, I RI~QU gs•rrm P.DD I'l' !ONJ\f .. 
PlmSOt~Nf::T,. t-IE IH:CfnV f::D AU'I'IIOIH ZA'I'JON FOR ONI, Y '1'8N J\DD ITIONAL 
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AG~NTS. SO I STRIPPED ADDITIONAL P~RSONNEL FRO~ OTHER 
IMPORTANT NARCOTICS INVESTIGATIONS ~0 FORM A SP~CIAL TEAM FOR 
LAB INVESTIGATIONS. 
DURI~G 198~ W8 ASSIGN~D THE EQUIVALENT OF 24 AGENTS 
FlJf,r, 'fiME •ro 'l'IIIS El~FOR'J'. 'rilE 'rEMl SEIZED 58 CLANDES'riNE r_.!\13S 
AND cr_,OSI~IJ AN ADDITION1\L 33 Li\B CASES BY REPORT, \'H'rll EACH CASE 
REQll IRING AH AVf~HAGE OF 437 AGEN'l'-HOURS .. 
IN ADDITIOH TO 'l'IIE TOTAL Or, 91 CLOSED CASES, B.N.E. 
IDJo:N'~H'IED 317 CASES TllA'r \•1E COLlLDN ''r INVBSTIGA'r g l"OH LACK OF 
MANPOWER AND RRSOURCES. AT 437 HOURS P8H CASE, ~ACKLING THESE 
LABS WOUT_,D HAVE REQUIRE:D AN ADDITIONAL 69 PERSONNE.rJ YEARS. AND 
'l'UAT DOESN 1 'f BE:GIN ·ro Tld<E Itl'l'O COUNT THE HANY I.EADS THAT COUI.,D 
BE GE:NERA'rED 'l'IIROUGJl P I\.Ol'ER .1\NALYSIS OF OUR PRECUilSO.K CASES. 
ANY ql1Y YOU f.OOK AT I'r, CALil',ORNIA IS BADJ,Y 
UNUJ·:ItSTAFI;'ED ll'r 'rilE: S 'l't'. 'l'E L8Vl~L r., (>R DBALING 'VH'l'H 'l' HI.::SF.: 
EX'rHAORIHIP\IUf_,\.' COf'lPl·ICA'.rED MUJ DIF' l•'ICUL'r l.N\'ESTIGATIONS. 
f_,ET 1 S TAI~E l\ TJOOK .l\T HO\•l HE CmlPARE 'EO 0'£Hl~R S'rATt::S. IN RA'l'IO 
OF S'rA'J'E Dl~UG ENFORCI:.mENT AGEN'l'S '1'0 POPULA'£ION, \vi'~ M1.E 'l.'OWARD 
Till~ BO'l"l'ON OL~ 'l'IIE T...IS'l' --- BOTH At-10NG THE NATION 1 S Lfi.RGE STATES 
AND At10NG OUH tmAR NEIGHBORS. 
ARIZONA AND HC:\•1 MEXICO IlAVg J?IVE TO SEVEFJ 'rll'lES MORE 
SThTE AGENTS PER CAPITA. AND TEXAS, WHICH IS T•IE O~LY STATE IN 
'fill~ COUt~'l'l<'i ~H'l'H A Cr,ANfH:.!S'fiNE LAB PROAL EM COMPARt.I3Lg •ro OURS, 
liAS MORI~ 'l'llAN 'r\-HCE: A:J ~1ANY AGEN'l'S P~~R CAPI'fA Tlli\N CAT.,I.FORNIA. 
miY S'J~A'fE l~Glm'rS? 13ECAUSJ~ \'li.; ARE DEAT.ING \VITH MUTf .. I-
JUHl~DIC'l'IONJ\£J C!\~1~~1 HEOUITUNG A COOHDINA'rED EFFOH'r NITH OUR 
BUHE/\ll 01!' l''OHEN;>I C Sl·:I{VtCES 1 'l'fllln'EgN H.~:GIONi\L CRH\1·; [,1\BS. 
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wg CAN cgRTAINLY ST.ICE. TilE , PIE DIFFERI'~NTLY ,AT B.N.t::., 
BY ABANDONING OUR ~IGHT AGAINST HARD DRUG, BY ABANDONING 
0 0 
PltRSCRIPTION DRUG DIVERSION ENFORCEMENT, AND BY ABANbONING 
MAR! HUANA EAlWICATION EFFOR'l'S. Dil'r THA'l' i"1AKES NO sgNSE. THE 
F'ACT IS 'l'IIA'r OUR PIE IS TOO SMALL WITH 13UT 115 NON-SUPERVISING 
AGENTS IN ALL OF B~N.E. 
AND 'fHE PROBLE!'-1 IS EVEN \-JORSE IN OUR RURAL AREAS 
BECAUSE I,OCAL RESOURCES ARE STRE'fCHED so THIN. AT THE BOT'l'OM 
op · 'fliiS Clll\H'.r You • r,r. SEE THAT, ON THE AVERAGE, TIIERE IS ONE 
LOCJ\T, S\'WHt-J' OFI!'ICER ~'OR gvERY 414 CITY RESIDf.NTS. IN RORAI, 
AR~AS THERE'S ONE LQCAL OFFICER FOR EVERY 615 PEOPLE. 
NO'l' ONLY DO RURAL OF'FICERS SERVg !'lORE P80PL~ 1 THEY 
t1US'l' COVFm SUBS'fANT[ALI,Y NORE TERRITORY. THERE IS ONE OFFICgR, 
FOR EVERY 2-SC)UARE MITJES OF U rm.n.N TERRI'l'ORY IN THE STATE. IN 
H.URA.L ArmAS THE c'IGURE: IS 60 SQUARE: t-1ILES PER Of.'FICER. NOvj YOU 
CAN BEGIN TO SEE \'7llY CLANDES'l'INE Li\BS LOCATE IN RURAL AREAS · 
EVEN THOUGH THEIR SUPPLIER~ AND THEIR MARKETS ARE IN THE 
CI'l'IES. 
I AM IN THE PH.OCr.;ss OF PREP/\RING FOR THE LEGISf,l\TURE 1 S . 
CONSIDERATION A MAJOR PACKAGE ~0 ADDUESS THE CLANDRSTINE 
LABORATORY PROFH.EM. THE PROGRAM WILL TARGE~~ 'filE: EN'fiRE 
MANUP.l\C'fUHING PROCESS FROM Clli.'~MICl\.L PRECURSORS TO PROFI'l'S . IN 
THE GANK. ~T EVERY STEP ALONG THE WAY WE'RE GOING TO INTERVENE 
TO MAKE LII!'E MISERAUT.r.; FOR TilE DRUG 1'1f.:~RCBAN.'fS. 
AS •rlJE r .. EGI_sr.ATION rs nsvr::r.tn .. c:n WE \Ur.r., OF couRsE, 
FOIU-JARD l'f IN DE'fAIL TO TilE Ll·;GISLATUHE •. BU'r I DO \'JAN'l' TO GIVE 
YOU l\.~ OVERVIEW TODAY OF THE ST~PS WE WILL ·B~ PROPOSING. · 
-9-
\iE BEGIN WITH A GREATLY S'l'RENGTIIENEI> PRECURSOR 
CONTROLS PROGRAM. THE FIRST REQUIREMENT HERE IS AN AGGESSIVE 
EFFORT USING AUDITORS TO REVIEW CHEMICAL SALES RECORDS AND 
INSURE PROPER REPORTING COMPLIANCE. 
THEN WE WILL NEED A STRONG CADRE OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR 
ANALYSTS TO COMPUTERIZE THE REPORT DATA, ANALYZE IT, AND 
GENERATE LEADS ON Ll\BORATORIES THROUGHOUT THE STATE. 
SURROUNDING STATES ARE GRADUALLY BRINGING THEIR 
PRECURSOR REPORTING L~WS IN LINE WITH CALIFORNIA'S. IF WE ACT 
NOW, WE CAN GREATLY INCREASE THE EXPENSE AND THE DANG~N OF 
OBTAINING THESE CHEMICALS. AND WE MAY WELL DRIVE MANY L~B 
OPERATIONS OUT OF THE STATE. 
AS I'VE ALREADY MENTIONED, IT IS POINTLESS TO GBNERATE 
NEW LE/\L>B IF wg DOH 1 '1' BAVt!: THE AGEN'.L'S TO f''OLI ... 0\'1 TIIEM UP. WE 
MUST SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASC ENFORCEMENT IN THE FIELD. 
THEREI!'ORE. 1 I WILL PHOPOSE '.L'liE CREATION OF A I..AB TAGK FORCE IN 
EACH OF OUR SEVEN FIELD OFFICES AROUND THE STATE. 
IN ADDITION TO INV~STIGATING LEADS GENERATED BY 
PRECURSOR ANALYSIS, THE TASK FORCES WILL COORDINATE AND 
COOPERATE IN EFFORTS BY LOCAL AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS. 
IMPORTANT TUOUGH IT IS TO REINFORCI:': B. N. E. 1 THAT 
CANNOT l1ND SIJOlll .. D HO'f REPLACE LOCAL EFr'ORTS. THEREFORE WE 
PROPosg '£0 !NVES'r HEAVILY IN STRENG'l'BENING LOCAL LAW 
ENFOKCEMENT'S WORK IN THIS AREA. 
FIRST, ~8 WILL ST~P UP OUR TRAINING PROGRAM TO HELP 
LOCAL AGEN'fS Uf~C0t-1E PHOr'lCIENT IN 'fHF: TECHNIQUES AND SAFETY 
PRECAUTIONS FOR LAU INVESTIG~TIONS. 
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WE WILL ALSO PROPOSE AN IN9ENTIVE FU~D TO ENCOURAGE 
LOCAL JURISDICTIONS •ro TAKE ON · THESE .DIFFICULT AND EXPENSIVE 
CASBS. AS IT STANDS NOW, WITH SO MANY OTHER SERIOUS DRUG 
PROBLEMS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, AND WITH EACH LAB INVESTIGATION 
INVOLVING HUNDREDS OF HOURS 1 THERE IS A REAL DISINCENTIVE '1'0 
TACKLE THEM. BY HELPING TO EASE THE BURDEN ON LOCAL BUDGETS, 
WE IIOPE 'fO HET~P FOCUS MORE r~OCAL RESOURCES AND EFFORT ON THE 
PROBLEM. 
ONCE STATE ' OR LOCAL -OFFICIALS HAVE TAKEN D~WN A LAB( . 
THEY FACE THE PROBLEM OF STORING AND ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE. . . 
. . 
THEREFORE, WE WILL INCLUDE TWO TRAINED CRIMINALISTS ON EACII LAB 
TASK FORCE, TOTALLING FOURTEEN STATEWIDE. AND WE WILL PROPOSE 
Tim CREI\.'riON OF SEVERAL FACILITIES AROUND THE STATE FOR SAFE 
S'l'OHAGL;; OF' LAB EVIDENCE. 
I SHOULD ALSO MENTION THAT, AS PART OF OUR ONGOING 
Pi:OGHM1 •ro .UPGRADE TH~ S'rA'.l'E 1 S FORENSIC LABORA'fORIES vJE HAVE 
RECOMMENDED CREATING THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINALISTIC INSTITUTE. 
ONE OF C.C.I. 1 S KEY FEATURES WOULD DE THE ABILITY TO ANALYZE 
SYNTIIE'fiC NARCOTICS. CURRENTLY ONLY n'10 LABS IN· THE COUNTRY 
CAN DO THIS WORK-- ONE . OF THEM AT U.C. DAVIS. 
LAST WEEK ALONE THERE WERE BELIEVED TO BE FIVE 
OVI~RDOSE DEATHS 1~1Wl1 SYNTHETIC HEROIH IN SAN FRANCISCO. 'fHE 
DEMANDS F6R LABORATORY ANALYSIS ARE SKYROCKETING. WE CANNOT 
GE'l' BY MUCH r~ONGER vHTH ONLY ONE FACILITY. 
NEXT WE COME TO THE PROnLEM OF CLEANOP AFTER A LAB IS 
SEIZED. 'l'IHS IS NOT MF.:RET~Y A .LAt-1 ENFORCEMENT PROBLEM, ,I'r 1 S A 
MJ\JOH gNVI HONNt::N'fA[. liAZARD. IT COSTS Ri'~'fWEEN $3000 AND $5,000 
'1'0 CLI::/\N UP 1~/\CH Or ... THESE 11INI-'f0XIC \·lAS'rF: Sl'l'gS. JI.NO II~ THl:! 
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CLEANUP IS NOT PROPERLY HANDLED, THE ' CONSEQUENCES CAN BE VERY 
SERIOUD INDEED. AGAIN, TilE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF CLEAN-UP 
CAN BE A DISINCENTIVE TO INVESTIGATING THESE CASES. 
HAVING CRIMINALISTS ON THE TASK FORCES WILL HELP WITH 
T~IS PROBLEM. BUT WE WILL ALSO PROPOSE A STATE-ADMINISTERED 
TRUST FUND TO IIELP REIMBURSE LOCAL AGENCIES FOR CLEANUP COSTS. 
TUE. NEXT PROBLEM IS PROSECUTION. AND, UNFORTUNATELY 1 
THIS IS OFTEN A POINT WHERE THE WAR AGAINST CLANDESTINE LABS 
BREAKS DOWN. AGAIN, TIIESE ARE COMPLICATED DIFFICULT CASES. 
STATE LAW IS LESS FAVORABLE THAN FEDERAL LAW FOR THEIR 
PROSECUTION, AND LOCAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS SOMETIMES FAIL TO 
PRESS THEM TO TRIAL. 
WE WILL PROPOSE A MAJOR NEW STATE DOLLAR COMMITMENT TO 
LOCAL PROSECU'riON OF THESE CASES. AND WE WILL ALSO ENCOURAGE A 
REVIEW OF SENTENCING. A.B. 275 1 SPONSORED BY MY OFFICE, BECAME 
LAW ON JANUARY FIRST o~· 'rHIS YEAR. IT RAISED THE SENTENCE FOR 
MANUFACTURING DRUGS TO A MAXIMUM OF SEVEN YEARS IN STATE PRISON 
AND CREATED THE PRESUMPTION, THOUGH NOT THE CERTAINTY, THAT 
SENTENCES WILL INCLUDE PRISON TIME. 
THAT WAS A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION AND WE SHOULD 
DO WIIATEVER CAN BE DONE TO IMPOSE HEAVY CRIMINAL PENALTIES AS 
WELL. 
THE FINAL STEP IN THE PROCESS IS GOING AFTER THE 
PROli'I'fS OF TilE DRUG MERCHAN'fS. WE ARE TODAY BUILDING ASSET 
FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS INTO EVERY LAB CASE. TO MAKE SURE IT'S 
DONE AND DONE RIGHT, HE PLAN 'fO INCI .. UDE AN AUDI'fOR ON EACH OF 
OUR SEVEN PLANNED CLANDESTINE LABORATORY TASK FORCES. 
-12-
THAT BRINGS UP THE QUESTION • OF COSTS~ MY ESTIMATR IS 
THAT 'rHE PROGRAM I HAVE OUTLINED HERE TODAY CAN BE IMPLEMEN'rgD 
FOR ROUGHLY $9 MILLION PER YEAR. BUT I \'JAN'r TO EMPHASIZE TIIA'r 
THE NET COSTS WILL DE SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER. FEDERAL ASSET 
FORFEITURE LAWS -- AND, I WOULD HOPE, IMPROVED STATE LAWS - AS 
WELL -- SHOULD PAY PART OF THE COST. 
ONE OF THE DISCOURAGING THINGS ABOUT DRU~ ENFORCEMENT 
IS THE CONSTANT BATTLE BETWEEN FINANCIALLY STRAPPED LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND CROOKS D~IPPING WITH MONEY. 
IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE 
WEEKLY SHOOTING BUDGET FOR NBC'S MIAMI VICE IS MORE THAN 30% 
HIGflER THAN THE ANNUAf, BUDGET FOR 'l'HE -RgAL VICE SQUAD IN THE 
CITY OF t1IAMI. 
ASSET FORFEITURE CAN HELP US REDRESS THE BALANCE. OUT 
NOTHING ~HLL DRY UP THE DRUG RINGS I,IKE GOING AI:'TER THEIR 
CASH. AND EVERY DOLLAR THAT WE CAN SEIZE FROM THEIR PROFITS 
t-1UST GO RIGHT INTO . Till:: NARCO FUND TO HET-'P US BREAK THE BACKS OF 
~HEIR ORGANIZATIONS. 
EARLIER I SAID THAT THE KEY TO THIS PROBLEM WAS NOT 
MORE LAWS BUT MORE ENFORCEMENT. · NEVERTHELESS, THERE ARE THREE 
LAWS THAT WOULD ·aE · VERY HELPFUL IN FIGHTING THIS BATTLE. 
I MENTIONED THE CHEt-HCAL EPHEDRINE A LITTLE WHILE 
AGO. IT IS THE KEY TO A NEW PROCESS FOR MANUFACTURING 
ME'l'IIAMPHI-;TAMINC:, BU'r IT IS .NOT CURRENTLY ON THE LIST OF 
CONTROLLED PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. I WILL SPONSOR LEGISLATION TO 
ADD EPHEDRINE TO THAT LIST~ 
TlJR "DESIGNER DRUG" PROBLEM ALSO REQUIRES LEGISLATIVE 
1\'l"rENTION. NE\!1 VARH~TIES 0~' SYNT.Hl~'riC DRUGS CAN BE CREATED 
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MUCH FASTfm '£HAN TllE LJ-;GISLATURE CAN • BAN THEM. IN THE INTERIM, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT IS HELPLESS TO PREVENT THEIR MANUFACTURE AND 
SALJ-;. 
THE ENTIRE FENTANYL FAMILY OF ARTIFICIAL HEROINS WAS 
REC~NTLY CONTROLLED THROUGH LEGISLATION SPONSORED BY MY 
OFFICE. THIS YEAR WE WILL SPONSOR A BILL TO AUTHORIZE THE 
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PLACE A DRUG IN SCEHDULE I FOR 
UP TO ONE YEAR ON AN EMERGENCY BASIS TO AVOID AN IMMINENT 
DANGER TO TilE PUBLIC SAFETY. THE TEMPORARY SCHEDULING COULD 
ALSO BE EXTENDED FOR SIX MONTHS, THUS ALLOWING PLENTY OF TIME 
FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION. 
FINALLY, I WILL PROPOSE A REFINEMENT TO OUR ASSET 
FORFEITURE LAWS. UNDER THE EXPANDED POWERS I SPONSORED IN THE 
1983 SESSlON 1 ~'JE CAN SEIZE FINANCIAL ASSETS 1 ·VEHICLES 1 
AIRCRAFT, AND BOATS OBTAINED AS PROCEEDS FROM ILLEGAL' DRUG 
TRAFFICKING. 
NOW IT IS TIME TO ADD THE AUTHORIT! TO SEIZE OTHER 
ASSETS SUCH AS REAL PROPERTY OWNED BY ILLICIT r1ANUFACTURERS AND 
USED TO FACILITATE TllE PRODUCTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES. 
IT'S HIGH ,TIME WE EXTENDED A LITTLE "POCKET BOOK JUSTICE" TO 
THESE CRIMINALS. 
THIS IS A COMPLEX PROBLEM. I HAVE TRIED TO TOUCH ON 
TilE KEY POIN'l'S r'OR THE COM~1IT'£EE THIS MORNING. IF I MAY SUM IT 
UP: WE ARE FACING A DEADLY SERIOUS CLANDESTINe LAB PROBLEM, 
ON~ TIIA'l' WF. KNOW IS ON THE VERGE OF GE'fTING MUCll WORSE. 
FOR MANY REASONS, THIS PROBLEM MUST RE ADDRESSEIT AT 
THE S'l'ATE LEVEL. YE'l' OUR RESOURCES ON THAT LEVBL ARE l''AR 13ELOW 
WIIA'l' O'l'HER S'l'A'l'F.S SPEND, AND 'l'O'l'ALLY INADEQUATE 'l'O DO Til£~ JOB. 
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IT IS 'riME FOR A CON·CERTED J:;FFORT 'l'O ATTACK THIS . 
PRODLEM AT EVERY STAGE OF THE PROCESS: FROM MONITORING 
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS, TO BUSTING LADS, TO ANALYZING AND STORING 
EVIDENCR, TO CLEANING UP AFTER THE RAIDS, TO EFFEC'riVE 
PROSECUTlON AND, FINALLY, TO MAKING SURE TIIE PROFTS FROM THIS 
DIRTY BUSINESS NEVE~· REACH THE POCKETS OF THE "COOKERS." 
ALL OF THIS CAN.BE ACCOMPLISHED AT . A MODEST ~OS~. THE 
TRULY EXPENSIVE PROPOSITION IS TO DO NOTHING AND WATCH OUR 
S'rATE 13E OV ERWHP.Lt1ED WI Til HOME-BRE\·lED DRUGS. 
I WANT TO THANK TH.8 COMMI'rTEE FOR ITS INTEREST IN TIIIS 
CRITICAL PRODLEM. I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING CLOSELY WITH YOU 
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Senator Seymour, thank you for inviting me to testify before your 
committee. My testimony will focus on ··the problems associated with 
clandestine drug laboratories and th~ir impact on criminalist& and forensic 
laboratories in California. I would like to submit a copy for the record. 
A major portion of my career was spent as a narcotic agent, and for five and 
one-half years, I was Chief of the California Bureau of Narcotic 
Enforcement. The move from narcotic enforcement.to the Chief of the state 
crime lab system has given me a number of unique insights. Through it all I 
have learned that California is a source for drug production and 
prescription drug diversion. The role that · California plays is very similar 
to that of countries such as Cblumbia and Thailand. California is 
responsible for diversion of major amounts of prescription drugs, the 
production of cannabis, and the production of controlled substances in 
clandestine drug laboratories. 
':fwo years ago, if I had been asked to characterize the clandesti'ne 
laboratory problem, I would have done so much differently than I will 
today. It is my belief that the role of California C'.landestine drug 
laboratories has grown from a relatively small part of the overall drug 
problem in the 1960's to potentially the )argest in the near future. 
In recent years, the federal government has taken · stro~g initiatives in 
foreign 'drug producing countries and has made concerted efforts to interdict 
smugglers before they reach the United States. Those who are familiar with 
• 
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World War II will remember the French line of defense which was known as the 
Maginqt Line. The Germans chose not to assault it directly but to race 
around its edgeR. I would submit to you that the. drug problem in this 
i 
country is no different. While we have a strong line of defense to deal 
with smugglers, they have circled around behind us and are now operating 
effectively in California. 
It is my view that our clandestine drug laboratory problem has two 
principle elements--the first being traditional. Within the traditional 
category, I suggest that the following elements are present: 
1. the chemical precursors used to produce the drug are 
supplied by domestic sources; 
2. reasonably simple techniques are involved in production; 
3. the drugs produced in these laboratories are most 
frequently PCP, and methamphetamine; 
4. from a forensic standpoint, they are easily detected 
either in solid dosage form or in bodily fluids; 
5. they are labor-intensive--both in the investigation and 
analysis phases; and 
6. from an enforcement perspective, they can be impacted 
significantly by strong regulatory control of the 
constituent precursor chemicals. 
. 
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The second element of ·the clandestine drug laboratory problem is the 
emerging type. The first involves cocaine reprocessing. This type of 
laboratory is similar in many ways to traditional· clandestine labs in that 
the product is easily analyzed and the forensic and enforcement activities ·, 
are labor-intensive. It differs in that 1) there is little c.hance of impact 
. 
through regulatory control and 2) that the laboratory location has been 
moved from a foreign country to California because of the effectiveness of 
federal initiatives, and the profit margins can be higher because overhead 
and middleman costs are cut. The emerging problem of cocaine reprocessing 
has the added dimension of requiring close coordination between federal 
government intellige1fce sources and state and local authorities to deal with 
the smuggling of the coca paste into California. Such a laboratory was 
seized in Lassen Oounty last year where over seven hundred pounds of cocaine 
were being processed. 
The second type of emerging laboratory that I see is one t.hat produces 
synthetic drugs or intentionally produces . analogs of drugs. This is the 
newest problem t ·hat we have had to confront and is by far the most 
threatening. The analysis of drugs such as fentanyl requires the 
utilization of methodologies and instrumentation in forensic laboratories 
that, in most cases, exceed existing resources. The very real potential 
exists that with the explosion in information technology, instrumentation, 
and chemical knowledge, drugs like fentanyl and its ilk could fill the 
demand for drugs suc.h as heroin and c.ocaine which have in the past come to 
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us from forei .gn countries. In the clandestine chemist's search for these 
substitutes, mistakes will be made such as that experienced in Santa Clara 
Cbunty where a substance known as MPTP was produced, consumed by drug 
addicts, and resulted in their contracting Parkinson's disease. I believe 
i 
the specifics of that situation will be presented later in the day. The 
synthetic and analog-producing clandestine laboratories thus present all of 
the problems associated with traditional laboratories but with added demands 
on user and environmental safety. 
I would like to say a few words about what the law enforcement approach has 
been to traditional laboratories. In March 1984, the Attorney General's 
COmmission on Narcotics Report was released which, in part, discussed 
California's clandestine drug laboratory problem. The COmmission 
recommended that maximum impact could be achieved at the state level by 
focusing the resources of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement on those 
aspects of the drug problem ·for which California was a source. At the 
direction of the Attorney General, the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement geared 
up its efforts in those areas. A very large ·program known as the Campaign 
Against Marijuana Planting (C~W) has focused on the domestic cultivation of 
cannabis in California and seized hundreds of millions of dollars worth of 
the product before it could be put into the distribution network. 
In the nrea of diversion of prescription drugs, the Bureau of Nar~otic 
Enforcement, together with the Drug Enforcement Administration recently 
• 
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completed a massive investigation in the Los Angeles area that involved a 
large nu~ber of physicians who were diverting prescription drugs and 
facilitating their shipment to other states for sale. 
In 1983-84 Fiscal Year, the Attorney General requested and obtained 
additional special agents to' focus on t ·he clandestine laboratory problem. 
In that budget request, it was recognized that in most instances, the 
primary source for domestic drug production in clandestine labs is not the 
laboratory operator but the wholesale or r~t~il ch~mical supplier who has 
efther knowingly or unwittingly supplied the precursors. California first 
instituted laws to regulate the flow of these precursor chemicals in 1972. 
Today there are more than two thousand retailers and wholesalers who can 
supply the materials required in clandestine laboratories. Five of the new 
special agents were to work with the chemical supply industry to ensure 
reporting compliance and an effective regulatory program. Unfortunately, 
the incredible incr~ase in the number of clandestine laboratories being 
identified by state, federal, and loc~l authorities resulted in all of the 
special agents being used to pursue criminal investigations. The California 
regulatory laws have been used as a model for other states, but 
unfortunately few states have a precurs·or control program. This has 
resulted in ruany of California's laborato~y operators being able to obtain 
their materials from out of state. In the future, a strong federal 
leadership role is necessary to bring more control to the movement oj 
precursor chemicals. 
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The clandestine laboratory investigation is a very labor-intensive activity 
with each case requiring about three months of special agent t ·ime. The 
forensic analysis by my staff requires approximately one-half month of 
criminalist time per case. There are currently about one thousand police 
and sheriffs' detectives assigned to drug law enforcement in California from 
I 
the more than five hundred police agencies. Few narcotic units have the 
resource capabilities to do what is required in clandestine laboratory 
investigations. California's police and sheriffs' forensic labs are also 
heavily strained by clandestine laboratory take-down and analysis. 
It is the· emerging problem of synthetic and analog production on which I 
would now like to focus my remarks. In this area, both the forensic and law 
enforcement respo~ses must be different from those employed with traditional 
clandestine laboratories. The forensic community must take the lead role. 
The fentanyl problem and the analog problem associated with fentanyl are 
giving us a glimpse of the future. The analogs of fentanyl, both in solid 
dosage form and in body fluids, requires the most sensitive of instruments-
tion. Most criminalistic laboratories' staff in the state are not trained . 
or equipped to deal with this problem. We are in the process of purchasing 
the required instruments and training the staff 'in our San Rafael laboratory 
to perform analysis on fentanyl. The drug is very difficult to detect. 
Traditional toxicological screening techniques are not sensitive enough. 
Probationers, parolees, military personnel, and physicians in diversion 
programs who must submit to urine screens will almost surely avoid 
• 
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detection. Forensic pathologists and coroners cannot detect either 
homicides or drug overdose resulting from fent'anyl. 'Through voluntary 
submission of body fluid and tissue samples to the University of California 
at Davis laboratory, 104 deaths have been identified. 
Each new · drug or analog of a drug will require the development of new 
methodology and training requirements for forensi<~ l<Lh•_,ra.t:ories. If the 
forensic scientist cannot analyze the drug in solid dose form, or identify 
it in tissue, or if when a clandestine' lab is seized, does not. know how to 
finish the production of the drug which may be at a midpoint in the chemical 
process, then law enforcement will not be able to act correctly, nor will 
prosecutors be able to bring charges. In our laboratory system alone, there 
are over one thousand drug analyses per yea~ which appear to our staff not 
to contain controlled substances. But because fentanyl and other drugs are 
present in millionths or billionths of a gram, they may pass through our 
system undetected. This state is served by two Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) laboratories, nineteen police and sheriffs' department 
laboratories, and the thirteen Bureau of Forensic Services labs. Of those, 
only the Drug Enforcement Administration has the ability to deal with the 
full spectrum of fentanyl-like drugs. 
The moHt serious problems which we in the forensic field must now confront 
deal with the issues "safety" and "training". The long term effects of 
exposure to the chemic.als involved in c.landestine drug produ<'.tion are not 
completeoly understood. Much remains to be done in terms of coordination 
;_8- • 
between law enforcement and criminalist& concerning the securing and 
dismantling of the laboratorie-s themselves. Unlike police officers who have 
a wide variety of training courses and formalized training plans to chose 
from, criminalists must rely on the FBI training laboratory in Quantico, 
Virginia, for instruction. Only a limited number of students can attend and 
often the waiting period for a particular course can be many years. 
Criminalists have no academy in California where they can be taught the 
basic skills required; and there is certainly no place they can go to be 
trained in the complexities of clandestine laboratories. Complex problems 
involving clandestine labo_ratories must be referred to the lfmi ted resources 
of the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
Those of us in the forensic field are worried about the future. Clandestine 
laboratories are a significant drain on our resources. They present safety 
risks and training problems that we are having extreme difficult in 
addressing. If we do not assume that the clandestine laboratory problem 
will increase greatly, then we will not be prepared. Some of our 
predictions in the past have been none too accurate. Who would have 
predicted PCP abuse--most exp~rts thought it was too toxic to ever become a 
drug of choice. We didn't believe that codeine could be converted back into 
heroin an~.yet in a clandestine laboratory in Stockton last year it was 
done. Who would have predicted that the Columbiana would bring their 
cocaine to California to process? &1d certainly no one among us would have 
believed that California would export marijuana to Europe. The drug 
• 
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trafficker is driven by the desire for profit.. The economic realities are 
that drug dealers and producers ~an reap more of a profit by producing their 
drugs in California. We must develop .a statewide strategy and act both 
firmly and quickly. Additional resources are needed if we are to succeed. 
·The . forensic community has always been in the "back seat" of ·drug law 
enforcement efforts but future successes will depend on our ability to ~ake 
a ·leadership role. Thank .you--1 will be happy to answer any questions you 
have. 

TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 
SENATOR JOHN SEYMOUR, CHAIRMAN 
BY 
ROBERT J. ROBERTON 
Chief 
Division of Drug Programs 
Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs 
State of California 
November 5, 1985 

THE NEW WAVE OF CLANDESTINE DRUG MANUFACTURING AND DISTRIBUTION IN CALIFORNIA 
IS SYNTHETIC DRUGS. THESE SYNTHETICS ARE DRUGS MANUFACTURED USING CHEMICALS 
AND PROCESSES WHICH WILL PRODUCE THE VARIOUS EFFECTs· THAT ARE SALEABLE TO 
STREET ADDICTS AND OTHER DRUG ABUSERS. THE SYNTHETIC DRUGS ARE CONTRASTED TO 
DRUGS SUCH AS HEROIN OR MORPHI~E THAT ARE PRIMARILY THE RESULT OF REFINING AND 
CONCENTRATING WITH THE BEGINNING PRODUCT BEING A NATURAL PLANT OR FIBRE. 
THE SYNTHETIC DRUGS HAVE SPECIAL APPEAL TO THE ILLICIT DRUG DISTRIBUTION AND 
CLANDESTINE LABORATORY NETWORK. IF A STREET DRUG CAN BE DEVELOPED IN A 
KITCHEN OR GARAGE LABORATORY THE MANUFACTURERS CAN AVOID THE RISKS OF 
IMPORTATION AND DISTRIBUTION. IN ADDITION, THE "CHEMIST CAN MAKE SUBTLE CHANGES 
AND THEREBY MANUFACTURE A NEW SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT LISTED ON CALIFORNIA AND 
FEDERAL SCHEDULES OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES; ACCORDINGLY, IT IS LEGAL 10 
MANUFACTURE AND SELL~ GENERALLY, THESE SYNTHETICS. ARE EXTREMELY POTENT AND . . 
ONLY MINISCULE AMOUNTS IN THE PURE FORM NEED TO BE TRANSPORTED FROM ONE 
DISTRIBUTION POINT Tq THE OTHER. YOU CAN HOLD 200 GRAMS OF 3-METHYL FENTANYL 
IN ONE HAND, THAT'S ABOUT 200 MILLION DOSES ON THE STREET. A CHEMIST COULD PUT 
ENOUGH IN THREE OR FOUR SHOE BOXES TO LAST THE HEROIN USING POPULATION, WHICH 
IS HALF-A-MILLION PERSONS IN THIS COUNTRY, FOR.ABOUT FOUR YEARS. SO HE COULD 
MAKE A BATCH, SHUT POWN AND DISAPPEAR. THAT'S JUST SPECULATION, BUT IT'S 
POSSIBLE. THE CLANDESTINE LABORATORY CAN OPERATE FOR JUST A DAY OR SO AND 
THEN BE DISASSEMBLED. THIS LESSENS THE DETECTION RISK COMMON TO OTHER ILLiCIT 
OPERATIONS WHERE THE LABORATORY MUST BE SET UP AND OPERATE CONTINUOUSLY. 
FINALLY,- THE PROFIT POTENTIAL IS TRULY REMARKABLE. A MERE $200 IN STARTING 
CHEMICALS MAY BE TRANSFORMED INTO AS MUCH AS $2,000,000 IN STREET VALUE. 
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IN THE COURSE OF LEGITIMATE DEVELOPMENT A NEW DRUG WILL GO THROUGH SEVERAL 
YEARS OF INTENSIVE LABORATORY TRIALS BEFORE IT'S EVER ADMINISTERED TO A HUMAN 
SUBJECT. THIS IS NOT SO WITH ILLICIT SYNTHETICS. A RELATIVELY KNOWLEDGEABLE 
CHEMIST CAN MANUFACTURE A COMPLETELY NEW COMPOUND AND IMMEDIATELY MARKET THEIR 
PRODUCT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION. THE NEW COMPOUND WILL HAVE NO SCIENTIFIC TRIALS 
AND ITS VERY FIRST USE WILL BE ON HUMAN SUBJECTS. 
WITHOUT QUALITY CONTROLS THIS SLOPPY CHEMISTRY HAS ACCOUNTED FOR SOME DISABLING 
AND CATASTROPHIC DAMAGE: SOME ENTREPRENEUR, APPARENTLY TRYING TO COOK UP 
SYNTHETIC DEMEROL MADE A MINOR MISTAKE AND ENDED UP PRODUCING MPPP ADULTERATED 
WITH MPTP. THIS CAUSED PARKINSON'S DISEASE SYMPTOMS IN DRUG ADDICTS. 
THE TERM "DESIGNER DRUGS" WAS COINED BY DR. GARY HENDERSON AT THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA, DAVIS. IN USING THE TERM HE REFERRED TO THE INCREASING 
SOPHISTICATION OF ILLICIT CHEMISTS WHO SEEMINGLY PRODUCED DRUGS DESIGNED TO FIT 
THE PREFERENCES OF INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS. WANT A SHORT ACTING DRUG?. LONG 
ACTING? INTENSIVE HIGH? OR WHATEVER? IT'S THERE FOR THE MAKING AND MIXING. 
THE MOST WELL KNOWN TRAGEDY ASSOCIATED WITH SYNTHETICS IS THE MPTP STORY. SOME 
REFER TO IT AS THE WALKING DEATH. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, WHILE ATTEMPTING TO 
HAKE MPPP, CHEMICAL ERRORS PRODUCED A COMPOUND CONTAINING THE NEUROTOXIN MPTP. 
WE NOW KNOW THAT MPTP SELECTIVELY DESTROYS BRAIN CELLS IN THE SUBSTANTIA 
NIGRA. THIS CAUSES PARKINSON'S SYMPTOMS IN MANY CASES. THESE SYMPTOMS MAY 
SHOW UP A FEW MOMENTS AFTER INJECTION OR SEVERAL WEEKS, MONTHS OR YEARS LATER. 
TO DATE, DR. WILLIAM LANGSTON C~ fHE INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH IN SAN JOSE 
HAS CONTACTED 400 IV DRUG USERS REGARDiNG THEIR EXPOSURE TO MPTP. 
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APPROXIMATELY 270 ARE CONFIRMED TO HAVE USED MPTP AND ARE AT RISK OF DEVELOPING 
PARKINSON'S LIKE SYMPTOMS. THE REMAINING 130 INDIVIDUALS HAVE NOT BEEN 
COMPLETELY EVALUATED. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THEY HAVE USED MPTP AND ARE AT 
RISK. 
THE FENTANYL FAMILY IS A CLASS OF VERY POTENT NARCOTIC _ANALGESICS ORIGINALLY 
SYNTHESIZED BY THE JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY OF BELGIUM. ALTHOUGH THE 
CHEMICAL STRUCTURES OF THESE DRUGS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE OPIATES; THE 
FENTANYLS, POSSESS ALL THE PHARMACOLOGICAL. AND TOXICOLOGICAL ACTIONS OF THE 
CLASSICAL NARCOTICS. FENTANYL, THE PARENT DRUG IS USED EXTENSIVELY IN CLINICAL 
. MEDICINE AS AN INTRAVENOUS ANALGESIC-ANESTHETIC UNDER THE TRADE NAME 
"SUBLIMAZE"·. IT IS A WELL RESPECTED DRUG. BEGINNING IN 1979, ILLICITLY 
SYNTHESIZED DERIVATIVES OF FENTANYL BEGAN APPEARING ON THE STREETS AS DRUGS OF 
ABUSE UNDER THE NAME OF "CHINA WHITE"; THE NAME USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH VERY 
PURE SOUTHEAST ASIAN HEROIN. SOON THEREAFTER, A SERIES OF DEATHS OCCURRED IN 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WHICH LOOKED LIKE TYPICAL HEROIN OVERDOSE DEATHS EXCEPT 
THAT TOXICOLOGICAL ANALYSIS FAILED TO DETECT ANY NARCOTIC. DR. HENDERSON 
IDENTIFIED FENTANYL OR FENTANYL ANALOGS AS THE CAUSE OF DEATH. TO DATE,· OVER 
100 SUCH DEATHS HAVE OCCURRED IN CALIFORNIA. - THE LABORATORY AT U.C. DAVIS, 
PARTIALLY SUPPORTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF -ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS, IS 
USING VERY SENSITIVE ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES SPECIFIC FOR THE FENTANYLS AND HAS 
DETECTED VARIOUS FENTANYL D.ERIVATIVES IN .BODY FLUIDS OF OVERDOSE VICTIMS. IN 
ADDITION, THEY HAVE DETECTED THE FENTANYLS IN THE URINE OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER 
OF INDIVIDUALS ENROLLED IN VARIOUS METHADONE AND OTHER DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS . . 
THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. OF APPROXIMATELY 500 ~RINE SAMPLES RANDOMLY COLLECTED 
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FROM NORTHERN CALIFORNIA METHADONE PROGRAMS 10J WERE POSITIVE FOR FENTANYL 
ANALOGS. OF THE SAME 500 SAMPLES, ONLY 3.8J WERE POSITIVE FOR OPIATES, 7/10 OF 
1J FOR AMPHETAMINES AND ONLY 2 PERCENT FOR ALL OTHER DRUGS COMBINED. FROM THIS 
DATA YOU CAN SEE THAT FENTANYL ANALOGS ARE BECOMING A MAJOR PROBLEM IN 
CALIFORNIA. 
CONFIRMED FENTANYL ANALOG OVERDOSE DEATHS COME FROM BOTH RURAL AND URBAN AREAS 
OF CALIFORNIA. SAN DIEGO COUNTY LEADS WITH 26. SIXTEEN COUNTIES IN ALL HAVE 
HAD CONFIRMED OVERDOSE DEATHS FROM FENTANYL ANALOGS INCLUDING SAN FRANCISCO, 
KERN, FRESNO AND OTHERS. TO DATE, THERE HAVE BEEN 10 ~FFERENT FENTANYL 
ANALOGS IDENTIFIED IN SAMPLES BEING SOLD ILLICITLY UNDER A VARIETY OF NAMES 
SUCH AS "CHINA WHITE" "SYNTHETIC HEROIN" AND "FENTANYL". SOME OF THE FENTANYL 
ANALOGS, FOR INSTANCE 3-METHYL FENTANYL, ARE THOUSANDS OF TIMES MORE POTENT 
THAN MORPHINE. 3-METHYL FENTANYL IS BELIEVED TO BE ABOUT 3,000,000 TIMES MORE 
POTENT THAN MORPHINE WHILE OTHERS MAY BE AS MUCH AS 6,000 TO 7,000 TIMES THAT 
OF MORPHINE. 
ON THE STREET MARKET FENTANYL IS TOTALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE IN ITS APPEARANCE 
AND EFFECT FROM HEROIN. THE FENTANYLS ARE CUT (DILUTED) WITH LARGE AMOUNTS OF 
LACTOSE OR SUCROSE BEFORE THEY ARE SOLD SO THE AMOUNT OF ACTIVE DRUG PRESENT IS 
EXCEEDINGLY SMALL. THESE AMOUNTS ARE SO SMALL THEY CONTRIBUTE NOTHING TO THE 
' COLOR, ODOR OR TASTE OF THE SAMPLE. THE INCREDIBLY HIGH POTENCY OF SOME 
FENTANYL ANALOGS MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO MIX THE DRUG WITH CUTTlNG 
AGENTS, CAREFUL MIXING BECOMES A SUPER CRITICAL PROCESS AND AN UNEVEN MIXTURE 
HAY HAVE CAUSED SOME OF THE DEATHS ATTRIBUTED TO FENTANYL ANALOGS. 
THE COLOR OF THE SAMPLES OBTAINED TO DATE, HAS RANGEry ~ROM PURE WHITE, SOLD AS 
"PERSIAN WHITE" TO LIGHT TAN SOLD AS "CHINA WHITE" "SYNTHETI~ HEROIN" OR 
FENTANYL TO LIGHT BROWN SOLD AS "MEXICAN BROWN". THE BROWN COLOR COMES FROM 
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THE LACTOSE BEING SLIGHTLY CARMALIZED. THE TEXTURE OF.SAMPLE~ OBSERVED IN A 
LABORATORY HAS RANGED FROM VERY LIGHT AND FINELY POWDERED TO SOMEWHAT COURSE 
CAKE LIKE AND CRUMBLY, SOMEWHAT RESEMBLI~G POWDERED MILK. 
OCCASIONALLY, SAMPLES WILL HAVE A MEDICINAL OR CHEMICAL ODOR BUT THIS IS NOT 
CHARACTERISTIC. 
IN SUMMARY, THE FENTANYLS APPEAR IN ALL THE VARIOUS FORMS THAT HEROIN DOES AND 
THERE IS NOTHING CHARACTERISTIC ABOUT ITS APPEARANCE THAT WILL IDENTIFY IT AS 
FENTANYL OR DISTINGUISH IT FROM HEROIN OR OTHER NARCOTICS. 
ROOTS OF ADMINISTRATION 
INTRAVENOUS INJECTION IS THE MOST COMMON ROOT OF ADMINISTERING THE FENTANYLS; 
HOWEVER, THEY MAY ALSO BE SMOKED, OR BECAUSE OF THE SOLUBILITY, ENHALED OR 
SNORTED. 
ABUSE POTENTIAL 
FENTANYL AS A PHARMACEUTICAL AGENT WAS ALWAYS THOUGHT TO HAVE A LOW ABUSE 
POTENTIAL BECAUSE OF ITS SHORT DURATION OF ACTION AND ITS RESTRICTED 
AVAILABILITY. ALSO, SUBLIMAZE IS AVAILABLE ONLY IN INJECTABLE AQUEOUS 
FORMATIONS CONTAINING EITHER 100 OR 500 MICROGRAMS PER VILE. THESE RELATIVELY 
SMALL AMOUNTS AND LOW CONCENTRATIONS MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR A TOLERANT ADDICT TO 
ADMINISTER A EUPHORIC DOSE CONVENIENTLY. 
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UNTIL RECENTLY, THE ONLY DOCUMENTED ILLICIT USE OF FENTANYL WAS IN DOPING RACE 
HORSES. NARCOTICS ARE FREQUENTLY USED TO DOPE HORSES BECAUSE THEY PRODUCE 
EXCITATION IN THE HORSE, AND OTHER ANIMALS AS WELL SUCH AS THE CAT AND MOUSE. 
FENTANYL'S SHORT DURATION OF ACTION AND ITS VERY LOW, DIFFICULT TO DETECT 
CONCENTRATIONS IN BLOOD AND URINE MAKE IT AN IDEAL DOPING AGENT. FENTANYL HAS 
BEEN USED IN THIS MANNER FOR NEARLY A DECADE. 
THE FENTANYLS ARE NOW AVAILABLE THROUGHOUT MOST OF CALIFORNIA, BECAUSE 
THEY MAY BECOME THE DRUG OF CHOICE BY MANY HEROIN USERS, IT IS OUR OPINION 
THAT FENTANYL USE WILL INCREASE IN CALIFORNIA. ITS USE WILL SPREAD TO OTHER 
STATES AND NEW DERIVATIVES WILL APPEAR PERIODICALLY. 
ANALYSIS OF SAMPLES FOR FENTANYL ANALOGS 
THE FENTANYLS ARE VERY DIFFICULT TO DETECT EITHER IN BODY FLUIDS OR 
PARAPHERNALIA BECAUSE THE AMOUNTS PRESENT ARE SO SHALL AND BECAUSE THEY DO NOT 
REACT WITH THE REAGENTS ROUTINELY USED IN THE ANALYSIS OF NARCOTICS OR OTHER 
COMMON DRUGS. IN FACT, THE U.C. DAVIS LABORATORY HEADED BY DR. GARY HENDERSON 
IS THE ONLY LABORATORY IN THE U.S. WHICH CAN RELIABLY DETECT FENTANYL ANALOGs· 
IN BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES. 
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS INVOLVEMENT 
DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS (ADP) IS VERY ACTIVE IN STUDYING THE 
SYNTHETIC DRUG PHENOMENON. OUR IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES ARE IMPROVED METHODS FOR 
THE DETECTION OF SYNTHETIC DRUG USAGE AND ENHANCED PREVENTION THROUGH THE 
DISSEMINATION OF UPDATED INFORMATION. ADP CONTRACTS WITH THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA DAVIS CAMPUS TO PROVIDE TESTING SERVICES OF BIOLIGICAL SAMPLES AND 
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POWDER OR PARAPHERNALIA FOR FENTANYL AND THE VARIOUS FENTANYL ANALOGS. IN 
ADDITION, DR. HENDERSON WILL ASSIST IN DEVELOPING A ROUTINE PRODUCTION TYPE 
TEST AND CONFIRMATION ANALYSIS METHODS FOR THE FENTANYL LIKE DRUGS. WHEN YOU 
CONSIDER THAT THE CONCENTRATION OF FENTANYLS IN BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES IS MEASURED 
IN PARTS PER BILLION IT IS EASY TO APPRECIATE THE DIFFICULTY IN DEVELOPING 
ANALYTICAL METHODS WHICH CAN RELIABLY DETECT FENTANYL ANALOGS AT A PRICE WHICH 
IS NOT PROHIBITIVE. 
ADP PLANS TO DO MARKET EVALUATION IN AN EFFORT TO CONVINCE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 
LABORATORIES THAT THERE WILL BE SUFFICIENT BUSINESS AVAILABLE TO JUSTIFY 
DEVELOPING THE ASSAY NECESSARY FOR FENTANYL TESTING AT A REASONABLE PRICE. 
THROUGH OUR CONTRACT WITH THE INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH HEADED BY DR. 
WILLIAM LANGSTON, ADP SUPPORTS A CONTINUING EFFORT IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE 
OF MPTP ON THE STREET AND THE IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION FOLLOW-UP AND TREATMENT 
OF PERSONS EXPOSED TO MPTP WHO ARE IN DANGER OF ACQUIRING MPTP INDUCED 
PARKINSON'S DISEASE. 
IN CLOSING, LET ME SHARE THESE THOUGHTS. 
1. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COSTS MUST BE CONSIDERED AN IMPORTANT PART OF ALL 
DISCUSSIONS REGARDING SYNTHETIC DRUGS. ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF THOSE DRUGS 
WHICH CAN CAUSE NEURODEGENERATIVE DISEASES SUCH AS MPTP. MANY OF THESE 
PATIENTS REQUIRE FREQUENT HOSPITALIZATION INCLUDING INTENSIVE CARE BECAUSE 
OF THE NEED TO STABILIZE THROUGH THER~PEUTIC DOSES OF MEDICATION. 
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SOME OF THEM, THE MORE SEVERELY AFFECTED, WILL REQUIRE LONG TERM AND 
CONSTANT NURSING SUPERVISION. A MOST COSTLY ENDEAVOR. WE CANNOT ESCAPE 
THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US A. PROBLEM OF SERIOUS MEDICAL 
AND ECONOMIC MAGNITUDE. SIGNIFICANT COSTS WILL OBVIOUSLY ARISE FROM NEEDED 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS AS THE PROBLEM'S SEVERITY 
INTENSIFIES. 
2. THE TRAINING NEEDS FOR BOTH LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE TREATMENT NETWORK MUST 
BE ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY. WITHOUT APPROPRIATE TRAINING THESE INSTITUTIONS 
CANNOT MITIGATE THIS EMERGING PROBLEM. 
3. LABORATORIES PLAY AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN OUR ABILITY TO DETECT THE FENTANYL 
ANALOGS IN BODY FLUIDS. CURRENTLY, WE HAVE ONLY ONE LABORATORY IN 
CALIFORNIA WITH THE EXPERTISE TO DO THIS. 
UNDER THE GUIDANCE AND SUPERVISION OF DR. GARY HENDERSON AT THE UNIVERSITY 
OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, WORK HAS CONTINUED FOR THE LAST FOUR YEARS TO 
ESTABLISH A ROUTINE TEST FOR THE ANALOGS OF FENTANYL. MOST LABORATORIES 
CAN TEST AT PARTS PER MILLION. WITH FENTANYL TESTING WE ARE TALKING ABOUT 
PARTS PER BILLION IN BODY FLUIDS HENCE ONE OF THE DIFFICULTIES. THE STATE 
OF CALIFORNIA'S DEPARTMENT OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG PROGRAMS WILL CONTINUE TO 
SUPPORT THIS WORK WHICH IS OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. 
I WOULD STATE EMPHATICALLY THAT THE USE OF FENTANYL ANALOGS IS ALREADY 
SPREADING THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES. UNTIL WE HAVE A NETWORK OF MORE 
SOPHISTICATED LABORATORIES, WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TRACK OR UNDERSTAND THE 
SCOPE AND MAGNITUDE OF THE DEVELOPING PROBLEM. 
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4. THE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF NEW, POTENT, SYNTHETIC DRUGS WILL BE THE MAJOR 
DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE. AS EFFORTS TO CONTROL NATURAL PRODUCTS 
SUCH AS OPIUM, COCA,- AND MARIJUANA BECOME MORE SUCCESSFUL, AND AS 
SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF PHARMACEUTICALS BECOME MORE 
EFFECTIVE, THERE WILL BE MORE INCENTIVE TO ILLICITLY SYNTHESIZE DRUGS 
LOCALLY. 
5. NEW SYNTHETIC DRUGS WILL APPEAR WHICH WILL BE MORE POTENT AND MORE 
SELECTIVE IN THEIR ACTION. 
6. SMOKING AND "SNORTING" THESE DRUGS (ROUTES OF ADMINISTRATION DIFFICULT TO 
DETECT) WILL BECOME MORE POPULAR. 
7. THE USE OF THE NEW SYNTHETICS WILL SPREAD TO OTHER STATES AND COUNTRIES. 
8. THE LOW RISK OF DETECTION WILL STIMULATE THEIR USE IN POPULATIONS SUCH AS 
PRISONERS, PAROLEES, AND MILITARY PERSONNEL. 
9. EASY TO SYNTHESIZE FROM COMMON ' INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS. 
10. PRODUCE. EFFECTS IDENTICAL TO HEROIN. 
11. EXTREMELY POTENT (1000'S OF TIMES HEROIN). 
12. NOT PETECTED BY ROUTINE CHEMICAL ANALYSIS. 
13. NOT CLASSIFIED AS RESTRICTED (ILLEGAL) DRUGS. 
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14. LESS SOPHISTICATED LABORATORIES WILL ATTEMPT TO MAKE FENTANYL 
DERIVATIVES, THUS INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF TOXIC BY-PRODUCTS. 
15. OTHER FAMILIES OF VERY POTENT HEROIN-LIKE DRUGS WILL BE SYNTHESIZED, 
APPEAR ON THE STREETS, AND BE EQUALLY AS DIFFICULT TO DETECT. 
16. FAMILIES OF OTHER DRUGS OF ABUSE (COCAINE, THE HALLUCINOGENS) WILL BE 
SYNTHESIZED AND APPEAR ON THE STREETS. 
IN SHORT, IN THE FUTURE, DRUGS OF ABUSE WILL 
BE SYNTHESIZED DOMESTICALLY FROM READILY 
AVAILABLE CHEMICALS IN CLANDESTINE LABORATORIES 
THE DANGERS OF THE PESIGNER DRUG PHENOMENON 
PREPARED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE 
ON DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 
November 5, 1985 
by 
J. William La~gston, M.D. 
Director, Parkinson's Research and Clinical Programs 
The Institute for Medical Research 
and · 
The Santa Clara Valle~ Medical Center 
Senator Seymour and.colleagues, ladies and gentlemen-
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the important 
issue of "designer drugs". I believe I may have been the first 
to testify on this issue at your original hearing, which was held 
on October 22, 1984. It is gratifying to see that the level of 
attention and interest by local, state and federal authorities 
has gained momentum since that time. The problem coniinues to be 
a potentially serious and explosive one, a fact that I'm sure you 
are well aware of. As there are many others here today who will 
be discussing in some detail the principles and concepts behind 
"designer drugs", and the potential reasons for their growth, I 
would like to focus on the medical hazards as a physician and as 
the one who has had perhaps the most experience with "designer 
drugs" which cripple and maim. 
This experience began for us in 1982. At that time, I had 
neither heard of the concept of "designer drugs", nor was I aware 
that such things were feasible. In July of 1982, we began seeing 
a series of young adults who had, literally overnight, become 
frozen ·and··unable to move. This was a dramatic and frightening 
medical presentation, and I had never seen anything like it 
previously. Over a period of approximately three weeks, we 
accumulated seven such cases •. These young people were unable to 
speak, walk, or voluntarily move. Some were severely troubled by 
tremor. · Even more remarkable, their signs and symptoms resembled 
those of severe Parkinson's disease, a syndrome that we usually 
see only in aged individuals. As part of this testimony I will 
be showing a videotape to illustrate the condition these patients 
were in. 
The discovery of these cases, and the fact that the onl1. 
common link between them was the use of "synthetic" or "new' 
heroin, set off an intensive investigation to track down the 
offending agent. This effort eventually led us to the Lane 
Medical Library at Stanford to search for a 1947 paper by Albert 
Ziering and colleagues describing the synthesis of a synthetic 
narcotic which belongs to the same family as Demerol, a 
frequently used analgesic. For short, I will call this compound 
MPPP. Much to our amazement, this article had been very 
carefully razor-bladed out of the Stanford Medical Library as 
were several other relevant articles. We now know that an 
individual (who we have heard holds a law degree) had done a 
careful literature search looking for a narcotic which was both 
uncontrolled (i.e, legal to possess) and easy to synth~size. 
HPPP met both of these criteria. We now know that this compound 
was synthesized in a garage laboratory and sold on the streets of 
northern California as "synthetic heroin". We further know that 
this individual eventually made a bad batch of "synthetic heroin" 
which contained almost pure MPTP, a by-product of synthesis of 
MPPP. Either too much heat or acid produces this compound which 
we now know to be one of the most potent neurotoxins ever 
described. This compound crosses into the brain and selectively 
destroys nerve cells in the brain which are responsible for 
movement. These nerve cells are located in an area called the 
substantia nigra and happen to be the very same cells which die 
in Parkinson's disease. This latter effect explains why these 
patients look so much as if they had Parkinson's disease. This 
damage to the nervous system is permanent and many of these young 
people are in a rather precarious and critical condition in terms 
of management of their medical care. Further, we have now 
identified over 400 individuals who may have been exposed to this 
compound, raising the spectre of an epidemic of Parkinson's 
disease in the future. We now spend a fair amount of time just 
trying to regulate medications of the more severely affected 
people and in attempting to locate and follow those who we think 
are at risk. 
We believe this represents the first "designer drug 
disaster", something which one might have predicted could occur 
based on the principles involved. I believe there are three 
major medical hazards to the "designer drug" approach, a 
phenomenon which we fear may spread for reasons that I'm sure you 
will be hearing repeatedly today. The first hazard relates to 
the synthesis of a new compound which is destined for human use. 
Anytime a legitimate drug company makes a new compound they are 
required to carry out studies on it in animals for years before 
taking it to humans. In the case of designer drugs, the process 
is almost instantaneous, in that after a new compound is 
synthesized the first animals to be subjected to its effects are. 
human. In other words, addicts are in essence being treated as 
human guinea pigs. If these "illicit chemists" and the addicts 
are fortunate, the new compound will be safe, and non-toxic. 
However, there is no way of predicting when one of these new 
analogues will turn out to be a poison. Secondly, these 
laboratories never have quality controls. A legitimate 
pharmaceutical company, of course, has to carefully monitor the 
quality of the products they make. On the other hand these 
"kitchen chemists" rarely, if ever, have the analytic equipment 
available to see if their compounds are pure. This is, in fact, 
what happened with MPTP. The third major problem is the potency 
of the new "designer drugs", something I'm sure you will hear 
more in detail about from Dr. Henderson. 
I'm gratified to see these hearings being held because the 
time to act is now. Although the first "designer drug disaster" 
has indeed occurred, one can hope by taking a multi-faceted 
approach, further such problems might be avoided. 
In regard to what steps might be taken to combat this 
potentially serious social and public health problem, I would 
offer the following suggestions: 
1. The drafting of new legislation to try to remove the 
incentive of being able to make "legal" narcotic substitutes 
has already occurred in the state of California. I would 
urge that an on-going effort be initiated to assess the 
effect of this legislation, so that ways to modify and 
improve upon what has already been done can take place on an 
ongoing basis. 
2~ If future medical hazards are to be addressed, a carefu~ 
monitoring program must be carried out. We have attempted aq 
active intervention program using an "anonymous sample" 
program, combined with considerable publicity to notify . 
addicts that they could get the drugs they're using tested. 
While we have collected over 80 samples through this program, 
I feel that by and large it has proved an inefficient and 
inadequate way to find out what is being sold on the streets. 
The only avenue I know at present is to develop and support 
an intensive monitoring program to assess the content of 
samples of drugs. Such samples could come from a combination 
of tho~e garnered in arrests and drug raids, as well as 
street buys. An active and on-going "street buy" program, 
I'm beginning to believe, is the only way to accurately 
monitor what new compounds are being made and sold as street 
drugs. 
Such a monitoring program should represent a statewide 
network, such that new drugs can be quickly identified and 
word transmitted throughout the state. This will require a 
central and sophisticated laboratory, capable of identifying 
new compounds as well as those already discovered. 
3. Biological testing for new compounds. This laboratory 
should have the capability to carry out biological testing of 
new compounds to test for toxicity. Those which are toxic 
could quickly be identified and appropriate.warnings could be 
posted. If another MPTP-like disaster could be a~oided, the 
financial savings could be enormous. We estimate one patient 
alone, requiring full time nursing care, could cost the'state 
between $20,000 and $30,000 per year. 
4. The development of · screening procedures for well defined 
designer drugs. Once compounds were identified and clearly 
established t6 be constantly produced for street consumption, 
a third responsibility of this laboratory might be to develop 
screening procedures so local authorities could easily check 
for either the compounds or their metabolites in samples and 
biological fluids. 
5. The development of a consultation team that could respond 
immediately when new designer drug disasters are identified. 
Such a team might be comprized of a representative from a 
toxicology laboratory, an internist, a neurologist acquainted 
with the nervous system effects of these drugs, and perhaps 
someone at the State level to coordinate this effort. Such a 
team could quickly respond and evaluate new designer drug 
problems. 
6. Establishing a study of the "drug designer disaster" 
which has already occurred. We are, in essence, in the 
position of dealing with the many young addicts who were 
affected or potentially affected by MPTP. We strongly 
believe a comprehensive study of precisely how this 
"epidemic" occurred, and both the short term and long term 
consequences of such a potential health hazard, would be very 
valuable in learning to deal with future such episodes. We 
desperately need funding assistance to care for those 
patients already severely damaged as well as to identify and 
follow those who maybe at risk. The epidemiological benefit 
of initiating such a study is that it could allow us to 
develop techniques for studying future such problems. One 
good example of this is the drug intervention program. This 
came out of the study of M~TP Parkinson patients and, I 
think, it has taught us that an active intervention program 
with anonymous sampling may be only moderately effective. 
This could save time and effort in the future. 
The foregoing represent only a preliminary set of 
suggestions which I hope this committee will find of some 
value in responding to the designer drug problem. Agai~, I 
would emphasize that a central laboratory that could monitor 
all of these problems and establish a communications network 
with local and state authorities is c·entral to identifying 
and dealing with this problem, as well as monitoring and 
assessing the effectiveness of various forms of legislation 
which ar~ in place or being planned to deal with this 
problem. 
Again, thank you for the opportunity of testifing for this 
committee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. William Langston, MD 
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INTRODUCTION 
Just a decade ago drugs of abuse came from two sources: plants, like the coca 
bush and the opium poppy, and diverted pharma~euticals- . Today, new totally 
synthetic drugs produced by clandestine laboratories are becoming an increasingly 
important source of abused substances. These illicit laboratories are developing 
n·ew chemical entities from c;ommonly available industrial chemicals, and are 
distributing drugs which are both selective in pharmacological activity and very 
potent. Because of legal technicalities, these newly synthesized drugs may 
actually be immune from national and international regulations controlling abused 
substances. -
This· presentation wi 11 report on the rise of such clandestine 1 aboratori es in 
the United States which have synthesized and distributed synthetic substitutes 
for heroin; substitutes which have caused a number of overdose deaths. 
M~THODS 
During the past four years our laboratory has analyzed over 2000 blood, 
urine, tissue and powder samples for the presence of new synthetic drugs of 
abuse. These samp 1 es were obtai ned from coroner's 1 aboratori es, 1 aw i nforcement 
agencies and drug treatment programs. 
RESULTS 
· A total of 102 overdose deaths have been identified in which new synthetic 
narcotics were found in the body fluids. In all cases, these samples were 
thoroughly analyzed by forensic laboratories which were unable to identify any 
known narcotic or other drug of abuse. Of these 102 deaths, 99 occurred in the 
state of California, while the remaining 3 cases occurred in the -neighboring 
states of Arizona and Oregon. Most deaths occurred in Northern California and are 
thought to be due to 3-methyl fentanyl, a new derivative introduced on the 
streets during 1984. 
FENTANYL ANALOGS 
At least seven different compounds were identified: these include the 
narcotic analgesic fentanyl (Sublimaze8 ) and five simple analogs: alpha-
methylfentanyl, benzylfentanyl, para-fl uorofentanyl, 3-methylfentanyl, acetyl 
alpha-methylfentanyl, and an acryl analog of alpha-methylfentanyl. 
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF THE FENTANYL USER 
Data from i nvesti gati ve reports associ a ted with the fentanyl overdose cases 
have been compiled and the "typical" fentanyl user appears to be a 31 year-old 
white male living in one of the suburban areas surrounding · San Francisco, Los 
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Angeles, or San Diego. The deceased usually have a history of heroin addiction 
but in many cases the individuals appear to have been drug free for some time lnd 
only recently returned to drug use. 
FENTANYL USE IN DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAMS 
A total of 519 urine samples from persons enrolled in drug treatment programs 
were analyzed and fentanyl was found in 10% of the samples (range 0%-24%). This 
is equal to or greater than the incidence of heroin, amphetamine or cocaine use 
in these programs. 
FENTANYl USE IN CORRECTIONAl FACILITIES 
A total of 139 urine samples from m1mmum security correctional facilities 
were analyzed and fentanyl was found in 2% of the samples (range 0%-4%). These 
data suggest that the fentanyls are not in use in correctional facilities at this 
time. 
COMMENTS 
Our findings indicate that clandestine laboratories are now systematically 
di stri buti ng new, very potent, synthetic drugs of abuse throughout the State of 
California. The distribution of overdose deaths and the personal profile of the 
victims suggest that these drugs are not being distributed within any localized 
geographical area or to any particular ethnic or age group, but instead seen to 
be distributed rather uniformily throughout ·the addict population. Most 
surprising has been the occurrence of these drugs in suburban, even rural areas. 
Further, our most recent observations suggest the distribution of the drugs is 
spreading to other areas of the country. 
It is this author • s opinion that in the future, the domestic production of 
new, potent, synthetic drugs will be the major problem we will face in the area 
of drug abuse. As efforts to control the production and distribution of natural 
products such as opium, coca, and marijuana become more successful, and as 
safeguards aimed at preventing the diversion of pharmaceuticals become more 
effective, there will be more incentive to illicitly synthesize drugs locally. 
The challenge of these new synthetic drugs of abuse is enormous. Little is 
known abo~:~t their pharmacology and toxicology. At best, only brief reports of the 
activity of some of these compounds are available and generally limited to their 
effects in laboratory animals. 
All the analogs we have identified to date are quite potent. In fact, 
3-methylfentanyl is 5000 times as potent as morphine. These very potent drugs 
carry a high risk of accident a 1 overdose, but a 1 ow risk of being detected by 
conventional analytical methods. 
Analogs of the fentanyl series are relatively easy to synthesize from 
inexpensive industrial chemicals and only small amounts need to be made since 
they are so potent. 
Finally, because these compounds are new chemical entities, they will not 
appear on any national or international list of restricted substance. At the time 
of this writing, four of the seven compounds identified in our study are 
restricted. 
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Our traditional responses to drug abuse problems offer little promise of 
success. 
Creative chemists have exploited the pharmaceutical chemistry literature to 
develop these new drugs; however, restricting access to this information is not 
feasible. The literature of the last 50 years of pharmacological research is 
easily access.ab le throughout the world and already contains synthetic routes to 
hundreds, even thousands, of potent narcotics, stimulants, hallucinogens, and 
sed at i ve-hypnot i c dr·ugs. 
Controlling the chemicals needed to make these drugs is also not likely to be 
an effective solution. In the past, this only stimulated clandestine chemists to 
assembl~ the drugs from more elementary precursors which are common chem.i cal s of 
commerce. 
Even locating and closing these laboratories has proven to be an extremely 
difficult task. These laboratories need operate for only a short time to make a 
few· hundred grams of very potent material. Also, there ·may be no legal 
justi fi cation to interfere wHh ·a laboratory that i-s synthesizing new, . as ·yet, 
unrestricted chemicals. · 
Simple answers to this problem are not·readily apparent; however,· we are not 
likely to find th~ .unless the problem is . first recognized. Educators an~ 
researchers should be made aware that the great advances in the pharmaceutical 
science which have yielded so many potent, life-saving medications are now 
providing a growing array of life-threat~ni~g drugs of abuse. · 
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Mr. Ghairman and fellow members of the c.ommittee. I would like to thank you 
for giving me the opportunity to speak before you tod~y. The issue of 
clandestine laboratories is one that effects us all in one way or another. 
Two months ago in Sac.ramento, a man was sentenced to prison for the 
c.landestine manufacture and distribution of methamphetamine (SPEED). 
Over a period of five years he had moved his secret labora~ory operation 
from plac-e to plac£' in Northern Californil'l. He seemed to h~ve a sense of 
knowing when his operation was about to be seized. 
Narcotics agent::; pursued him from rented homes by the sea, to mobile homes 
on seduded mountain property. Eac.h time the agents moved in they found 
notlting more th<m the lingering odors and/or chemical waste where the lab 
had been hidden. 
\-ll10n he was finally arrested, agents found portions of his laboratory 
secreted in a make-shift trcehouse on several acres of land. 
During this investigation anrl thrfJugh lenf~thy interviews following the 
arrf:'st, a great deal w<w learned abm.tt the secret opc..'ration. 
It was learned for instance how the necessary chemjcnls were transported 
fJ ·om c.lwmic.al c.ompanies in Cal ifornin, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington in 
rented trucks, to r~nted storage lockers. These lockers would b~ in close 
proximity to thf• st.•cret laboratory locations. The loc.kers would then be 
ut!liz£'d as 11 storf's 11 to h.! tnppc•d RS nl•ecled. This was all ~tccomplished 
usiur, prccautinnm·y llll'l\fHIJ"l'H sud1 as radio ac.annen; to monitor polic-e 
fn•qu('nci,•a, nnd in some 1natanc~s surveillance c.ameras. 
During this t !me period, this man produced up to 15-20 pounds of high grade .. 
methamphetamine per week. The finished speed was then distributed to major 
dealers in Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and Sacramento counties. 
He was proud of his business. His profits were immense. He drove Maserati 
and Porsche sports c.ars, lived in an expensive home in an affluent 
neighborhood in the Bay Area, invested in stocks, and paid cash for 
property. 
Life was good. Until he was arrested and sent to prison. 
During a recent jnterview he told us somPthtng that I want to share with 
you. He said that when he was sent to pr.lson this time (he had previously 
been ln~arc~ rated for kidnapping for ransom, and found drug manufacturing to 
be more profitable) thnt he was optimistic about his reception inside 
prison. 
He was sure of one thinn, that he would be revered for his ac.C.omplishments 
as the "c.hem:f.st" of a large scale drug producing operation. He said that he 
truly felt that he was going to he a member of an elite group of brotherhood 
of. criminals. 
Murh to his surprise he told us that pri6on is now full of enterprising 
clandeHtine drug chE•mists. 1he only distinction is that r.ne might be more 
knowledgc~ahle th.la th ·~ •:>ther. 
This example clearly represPntA the extent of the probl~m we are facing in 
California today. 
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Formulas for the manufacture of drugs such a~ speed and PCP are passed 
around in our penal institutions~ 
Street chemists lac.king in technical knowlege have no idea and, more often 
than not, do not care about the contamination that occurs to, 1) people 
using the drugs they produce that often contain poisonous impurities, 2) the 
natural ~esources when chemical dumping occurs. They also lack the 
knowledge of . the dangers of explosion and fire from bad chemical reactions 
and/or improper safety precautions. 
There ar~ clandentine laboratories that are seized as a result of explosion 
and fire. Firemen who are responding to these fires, are often una\.;rare of 
tl1e dangerous chemicals inside. Some of these chemicals are highly reactant 
with wat~r. The result is explosions, destructio~ of property, and 
contamination to the atmosphere. 
I want us all to remember for just a moment a couple of mbnths ago when we 
observed an entire city block burn to th~ ground in Philadelphia. The cause 
of thnt fire has heen adequately c"overed but if I may point out that a · small 
quantity of explosives were dropped on an apartment. Stored on the top of 
the apartment was a qunntity of gasol.ine. The results were d~vastating. 
It is by no m£'ans out of the realm of possibility that one of these 
c.lnndcstine laboratories, sec.reted within an apartment complex, stockerl full 
of volatile chemicals, conll l'l!Sillt in the same situation. 
I want to emphasize that while l.~gitimate industrial laboratori~s are 
dcnigned for saf~ty, claodestin~ laboratories are designed for secrecy. 
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There is no quality control assuring that strict EPA and FDA rules are 
followed insuring that our natural resources are not contaminated. 
I would like to give you some examples of clandestine laboratories and the 
way we find th~m. In doing so I would like to utilize some of the visual 
aids here today: 
methamphetamine lab in cul-de-snc 
bathtub speed lab 
bathtub speed lab exploded 
PCP lab site in desert area (contamination) 
exploded labs (dangers).point out in particular the apartment explision. 
These r.landestine labs utilize some of the most toxic substanc.es known to 
man during the prodttction of drugs. ThP hi-products of thes~ reactions are 
toxic as well. 
I think everyone in t;lti s room rem~?mbP.rs the rec.ent stat(~wide scare we 
experienced over the water~Plons that had been contaminated with 
carcinogenic pesticides. Several people became ill after eating the 
watermelons and the melons were subsequently removed from the stores. 
In the production of some of the drugs in clandestine laboratories in 
California, tl•e~re are chemicals that are used in the production of 
pestir.ic!E.>s. Those chemir.nls are c.arr.inogenic as well. In many of the labs 
that w~. seize, we find chemicals such as these dumped in our natural 
resources. 
Then• are. nlso rhemic.nls used in the cLtndesti.H.' manufacture of speed and 
1-'Q, that contain quantities of <'yunide. If the r.yanide · dt('mic-als are 
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acdc.lentally mixed with adds, a deadly poisonous ga~ is rE'leaaed. There 
are dor.umentc:•d a<".count s of cyanide deaths during the product ion of 
clandestine drugs. 
Evt•ryclay we read about the c.oncerns regarding toxic dumping in our 
newspapers. 
It Js import~nt to make note that out of the hundreds of clandestine 
laboratories that we have seized, wE' have. yet to se~ one single case where 
tl1e responsible party has disposed of the <'hemtcals . properly. 
In this state, everyday, there are seventl hundn•d labs being operated. The 
gallons q'f C'h('mic-.al wast c. produced froT!l these · operations art" being dumped 
lnto: 
1) Toilets where they end up in our s0~er systems, 
2) our J.ukes and streams, contandnating the natural resources, 
3) alon~side our roadwayn. 
Today, .d•J(_" to the. lack ?f funds . and knowledge, there are. still law 
(mforccment offleers who are exposed to these toxic substances. This occurs 
wh~n dismantling these laboratories, and transportin~ the hazardous 
substances in police vehicles. 
We do not hove the answers to the long tcrm eff~cts of toxic exposure. 
We do not have the ansWt:'rs to the long term effects of dumping toxic waste 
into the land. J>o~s 1 t c-.ontaminaLP the ~~roundwatrr? Will we ns a nation 
Huffnr r,~neti<- side. af !eetfl to past> on Lo future gene rations? The whole 
pirt'ure. of tllifl grO\Jing <'.::tn<'.er in our stntc ifi in<".rndihly c-omplex. 
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I have attempted to outlin~:> some of the aspC'<·.ts of the probl~m, in terms of 
what a clandestine lahonttory consists of, and the dangers inherent to 
them. 
WhC'n 1 bE>p,an tay pres(•nl Ht' ion I spok(~ of a man n~cent ly inr.arceratcd for 
cland\~stine manufacturing and distributing meth<1mphetamine. in CaliforniH. 
The investigation of that singular op<.>ration lHstcd for three years, from 
the time it begnn until the end of the. court proceedings. A<> a result of 
that investigation, sev('l'Hl others were initiated. Some- of "-'hich continue 
as I speak. 
Altl.ough it seems tllifl pr·oblC'm is insurmountable, I wo~tld like to quote from 
an old C.hitwse proverb. lt says that E>ven a thousand mile journey begins 
with a single nt'P.p. I l1ouestly believe that this hearing :f s the first rtep 
in n•cognizinr, LIIC' r.lnndestint? lahoral'ory problem in C!ilifotnia, and the 
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The problem of clandestine laboratories · has grown dramatically 
over_ the past five years, both locally and nationally. In 1980, 
the Drug Enforcement Adminis.tration, Dangerous Drugs Activity 
Report, 81-1, documented the seizure of 234 clandestine 
labor~tories nationwide. Of these laboratories seized 
nationwide, 146 were related to amphetamines and 49 were related 
to phen_cyclidine (PCP). In 1984, _ the - Drug Enforcement 
Adminis tra t .ion report on 
documented 
Clandestine Laboratory Seizures in the 
u.s. , 198 4, the seizure of 312 clandestine 
laboratories. Of these laboratories seized nationwidei 225 were 
related to amphetamines and 30 were related to phencyclidine 
·(PCP). This · represents a 33 percent fncrease in clandestine 
laboratories -during the past five ~ years. 
The Western_ States Information Net-work (WSIN) 1984 report on 
Clandestine Laboratories . documents ~he . seizure . of _ 100 clandestine 
·laboratories in the State of California. Of the laboratories 
seized in California, 81 were related to methamphetamine or 
amphetamines, 14 were phencyclidine (PCP) laboratories, and 5 
--
were other types of clandestine laboratories. 
The clandestine laboratories seized in California during 1984 
accounted for approximately 33 percent of all laboratories seized 
in the United States·. Unfortunately, California has no peer as a 
source "for cland~tinely manufactured· drugs. 
I ! ' 
During Fiscal Years 1983 and 1984, - the San Fran-cisco Division of 
the Drug Enforcement Administratiof1, which is responsible for the 
northern - · half of the State of Ciillifornia, nor_mally working in -
conjunction . with ~tate ·and local authorities, were responsible 
for seizing more clandestine laboratories than any other 
enforcement division of the Drug Enforcement Administration in 
the United States. 
The foregoing statistical data is offered as a foundation for 
what is to follow. 
The area of clandestine laboratory investigation is an area of 
investigation · that is little understood even in the narcotics 
enforcement community. The average DEA agent in a 20 year career 
will work an average of five clandestine laboratory 
~nvestigations. The average agent will be a case agent on one 
case. 
Officers and agents who work clandestine laboratories view these 
investigations differently from any other form of narcotics 
related investigation. This is not only because of the large 
amounts of evidence (usually seized), but because of the 
technical complexity of the investigations and related hazards. 
Approximately four percent of all clandestine laboratory raids 
result in hospitalization of at least one federal investigator. 
This is by far the largest single source of on-the-job injury 
incurred by federal narcotics officers. 
The hazards associated with clandestine laboratory 
investigations, are also different from other law enforcement 
investigations, and these hazards in order of priority 
(1) explosions; (2) fire; (3) weapons, and (4) short and 
term exposure to chemicals. On a national average, one of 
or 20 percent of all clandestine laboratories result in, 






During the past several years, the Sacramento Resident Office of 
the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Sacramento Office of 
the State of California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement have been 
working together in an informal task force operation. This task 
force group has responded to approximately 70 clandestine 
laboratories. In 10 percent of the cases, agents and .officers 




weapons. In 10 percent of the cases, agents ·and officers found 
some form of booby traps or explos~ve devices. In 30 percent of 
the -· cases, defendants were using some form of electronio 
countermeasures·. The electronic countermeasures ranged from 
scanners to sophisticated · .video monitors and sound sensing 
devices. 
The single, m9st significant, hazard encountered by agents and 
officers has been exposure to hazardous chemicals and chemical 
wastes. ·During . the course of 70 clandestine laboratory raids, 
13 firemen and 4 police officers . required medical · treatment as a 
result of exposure to hazardous chemicals and chemical wastes. 
The casualty rate is 24 percent. · Because of exposure to caustic, 
corrosive,- carcinogenic, cumulative, irritating explosive and 
flammable substances encountered at · lab sites ., every agent or 
officer of ·the task force has suffered· minor injuries. These 
injuries have included ·burns, rashes, headaches, lightheadedness, 
and nausea. This casualty rate . of 100 percent is totally 
unacceptable. In speaking to other officers and agents across 
the country, their injury and ., casualty figures are comparable 
with our own figures. 
Little :. is known . about . the long term e'ffects of expqsure to toxic 
and/or cumulative chemical substances. Of concern to narcotics 
officers is · the cumulative effect of chemical substances that are 
being absorbed into our systems. The chemicals in some instances 
can be absorbed simply by being exposed to the chemicals in the 
atmosphere. / , Other cheJ~~icals of a fat soluble nature can be 
absorbed through the skin. Of particular concern to officers is 
exposure to .PCP, its precursors or analogues. PCP, its 
precursors and analogues, have contaminated a nUmber of agents 
and officers. · The drug is ·cumulative · in . nature and has an 
unknown active life. It is also documented that .female officers 
who. have been exposed to PCP in the past, 
passed PCP on to their unborn children. 
have, at a later date, 
Other officers have 
reported symptoms of drunkenness, hyperactiveness, 
·. 
lightheadedness; headaches, skin rashes, elevated heart rate, 
confusion, short term memory loss, aggressiveness and 
hallucinations after exposure to PCP during laboratory raids. 
Studies have verified the presence of PCP in blood and urine 
samples of people who live near PCP laboratories and of narcotics 
officers who enter the laboratories. 
Two other clandestinely manufactured drugs that 
significant health and safety problems are the fentnyal 




fentanyls, minute amounts, as small as a grain of salt, can cat:.s6 
death. These compounds can be absorbed through the skin or 
mucous membranes. HPTP/HPPP laboratories also represent a 
serious threat and environmental hazard to both the public and 
narcotics officers since HPTP has been directly linked to 
Parkinson's Disease. 
Clandestine laboratories create a myriad of problems for which we 
have been unable to obtain acceptable answers. Host of the 
clandestine laboratories are found in rental properties. After 
officers are finished dismantling the laboratory and disposing of 
the chemicals and waste products, there is always the question of 
what to do with the rental property that, in most instances, is 
contaminated with chemical spills and permeated by hazardous 
chemicals. There are also questions about what should be done 
about -chemical spills on sides of county roads, where they were 
dumped by suspects. What about the chemicals and hazardous 
wastes that are being dumped on agricultural lands and in our 
rivers and streams? Will these chemicals appear in the food 
chain? What effect will these chemicals have on water supplies? 
In rural areas, where septage systems are utilized,- what effect 
will chemical wastes have on retarding the decomposition of 
effluent that leeches from these systems? What is the threat to 
the public? What is the threat to future occupants? Where and 




We are no longer talking about isolated incidents. Last year in 
a 26 county area of Northeastern California, we participated in 
the seizure. of 34 clandestine laboratories. If you believe that 
we are successful in apprehending iO percent of the clandestine 





laboratories in . the same area. If 100 laboratories 
in the State of California ·last year, 1,000 
were operational ~ Each _laboratory is creating 
health and environmental hazards. The · toxic and 
~oisonous waete~ proauced by these iaboratories are not measured 
~.: grc:~. en\.. o~c-=-~ . ·.:we- in t~~1z and t.:mdreds of pounds. 
The problems associated . with clandestine laboratories are not 
only the problem of law enforcement. Clandestine laboratories 
are a problem for public health agencies, environmental 
protection agencies, educational ~nstitutions, fire protection 
agencies, and other social services. ·The costs associated with 
the destruction of clandestine laboratories and their wastes are 
staggering. At the present . time the average cost of disposal of 
hazardous chemicals per laboratory is $3,000. 
The problem of clandestine laboratories is a phenomenon of our 
. . 
generation, but as in the case of PCP contamination, the problem 
will be passed on to future ·. generations. The costs for medical 
and health care for . con tami na.t e~ victims, projected into future 
generations, are enormous. 
What can be done with the problem of clandestine laboratories and the health 
and safety issues that they raise for all branches of our local, state and 
federal government? We do not have many answers, but we do have · some 
recODillendations. 
In the area of education: Public safety personnel, police, courts, 
corrections, and the public must ~iately be made aware of ·the health and 







public health services must become 
laboratory problem. Research must 
be done on the effects of exposure 
encountered in clandestine laboratories, 
to hazardous substances 
so that law enforcement 
personnel in the future do not have to serve as 
animals. 
laboratory test 
Defendants who knowingly and intentionally violate the law endang.er the public 
and pollute the environment should be held accountable for their actions, and 
they should be made to pay for decontamination of the areas they have made 
unsafe. 
There should be greater parity between state and federal law with 
enhanced penalties and fines for illicit laboratory operators. 
Penalties for recidivism should be doubled with no options 
allowed. 
Chemical companies who distribute chemicals that are used in the 
manufacture of clandestinely manufactured drugs should require 
full identification for all cash sales; ana additional chemicals 
should be scheduled. 
There is a need for additional trained manpower to combat this 
growing problem. 
There is also a need for safety equipment so that agents and officers don't 
continue to contaminate themselves, their families, and their own 
agencies. 
As public servants we have all taken oaths to, in one way or another, protect 
and serve the public. We will not have fully carried out our oaths until we 
have found solutions for the problems raised here today. 
I wish to commend this Committee 
taking the first and hardest step 
for holding this hearing and 
in attempting to ident~fy the 
problems associated with clandestine laboratories. 
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My name is Tom Abercrombie a:nd. rm a CriminaUs.t w.i.th ·the Office of the Attorney 
General, Bureau of Forensic Ser-vices, JU. verside Cr.imi nalistics Laboratory. I'v~ 
been employed as a Criminalist at that site sjnce :the middle o~ 1979. My 
immediate job is four-fold. The first aspec.t ·.o:f :1-t :is to use scientific means 
and methodo~ogies in order to analyzed physical evidence submitted to me by law 
enforcement agencies. Se.coodly, I issue repor.ts on my find~ngs, and also 
testify in court, if needed, on exactly· what ~y ·report and/or analysis means 
within the framework of the charges in quest_ip_o.. .Last.ly, but certainly not the 
least important of my duties is to a~sist law ~nforceme.nt agencies in field 
investigations. · Specifically, at theit' reques:t, .I -respond to the scene of 
various ci·imes in order to facilitate the inv~_s:t:igat:J.on or collection of 
evidence. 
My qualifications for my vocation ind\lde a fp,:-mal .. educat.i~o, induding graduate 
work in chemistry., as well as previous employment as .an analytical chemist for a 
manufacturing pharmaceutical company. 
Since 1980, I have been involved in the highly. spe<':.ial.ized area of clandestine, 
or illegal drug synthesis and/or labo~atories~ This area of criminalistics is a 
natural offshoot for me · due to my formttl ecuc.a~J.on., ·p.revious employment and 
extreme interest in the field. 
Additionally, since 1981_, I have been involved in· :research in this area, with a 
number of presentations to various professional scientific organizations to my 
credit.. Also, since that time, I .have bt-t>n ~)[t:reme-ly .active in training both 
law enforcement and other criminalist& about clandestine synthesis and 
clandestine laboratory investigation. 
2 
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The "specialization" tag I put on this type of · investigation is well warranted. 
Communication and coordination between the investigator and an experienced 
chemist is extremely important due to the highly technical nature of the 
investigation. The chemist must be able to answer the following critical 
questions: 
1. What type of drug is being produced? 
2. What time frame for the particular procedure are we dealing 
with? 
3. What safety measures should be taken? 
.. 4. What quantities of drug is the clandestine chemist capable of 
manufacturing at the site? 
These questions need to be answered as soon as possible for the investigator 
both for establishing the proper documentation and statements from an expert 
needed for writing and executing a valid search warrant as well as optimizing 
the time for the seizure of the clandestine laboratory itself. 
In order to answer these questions properly, a chemist ~ have both the 
knowledge and experience in many types of clandestine syntheses. The chemist 
must have the ability, often with only the barest of clues, to decide which of 
the many different methods the clandestine "cooker'' is utilizing to manufacture 
the drug in question. 
3 
He has to have ~ad practical experience in the synthesis of the drugs himself in 
order to be able to recognize what reaction is in progress and how to handle it 
safely. ·ue must know which items at a clandestine laboratory scene have 
evidentiary value and which do not. Since the chemist is the de facto safety 
officer at laboratory scenes, he must· also know what items are unsafe and how to 
handle them properly. 
The challenge of s.t~ying current with clandestine "cookers" is an ongoing demand 
due to the fact that with the· restriction or control of vat;ious chemicals, the 
"cooker" must radically change hi~ known procedure to an entirely different 
method with different chemicals in order to successfu~ly make the drug he wants. 
Does this then meap that the "cooker" is a chemical genius, and can at his whim 
change his procedure to fit whatever chemicals are at hand? The answer to that 
question is an emphatic HOt Perhaps then," the costs involved in set~ing up a 
clandestine laboratory are such that a natural economic limitation exists to 
halt or at least sl.ow the growth of c.lan(Jestine laboratories. ~ain, that is 
simply ~ot the case. 
What I intend tci_ explain next is how little time, money and effort it takes to 
manufacture a numbel~ of different drugs. · It must be under.st~od that I don't 
know how much these drugs sell for on the "street". I feel, though, it can be 
safely assumed that the profit margin is substantial. 









This is a chemical that ~ be used in the specific 
procedure at hand. It becomes the "backbone" of the 
drug substance. 
This is a chemical that usually must ·be used in the 
specific procedure at hand, but s9metimes can be 
substituted. It usually does not become part of the 
finished substance. 
This is a chemical that can easily be substituted. It 
is a liquid used to dissolve materials, to aid in 
separation or transfer. It does not become part of 
the finished drug. 
In a two-step procedure, this would be the form the 
drug takes after the first step, but before the final 
form. 
An analog is a chemical substance that exhibits a 
minor modification of the root drug form, yet usually 
exhibits a marked increase in the effect of the drug 
(e.g., Fentanyl and 3-Methyl Fentanyl). 
Phencyclidine, PCP, is the first drug substance I'll deal with. This drug, a 
parti~ularly potent psychoactive substance, is incredibly easy and inexpensive 
to make. It involves a two-step reaction with the formation of an intermediate 
cnllPd PCC (1-Piperidino-~yclohexane carbonitrile}, and th~ coltversion of that 
s 
• 
to PCP using a chemical solution called a·Grignard reagent. The synthesis of 
the PCC is usually an overnight procedure, whil~ the making of the Grignard 
reagent and the conversion of the PCC to PCP can tak~ as little as one hour. 
The normal apparatus used are 5-gallon white plastic buckets, broom.handles or 
sticks (for stirring) and large kitchen sieves (for filtering). The cost of the 
i 
chemicals and apparatus used can be as li·ttle as $50 - $70 to manufacture one 
gallon of PCP. This $50- $70 does not include the cost of . the critical 
precursor piperidine. 
Piperidine, though having many legitimate uses in the polymer industry, is 
tightly controlled in the State of Califorttia and sells for extraordinarily 
inflated prices when used clandestinely. 
This drug substance has spawned three cottage industries. One location will 
make the PCC. 'Another entirely different location will make the Grignard 
reagent. They will come together at a third location to make the PCP. 
Dangers of fire, explosion or· toxicity are found throughout this procedure. 
Potassium pr sodium cyanide is used in making t~e PCC, which itself contains a 
substantial amount of cyanide. Ether, a highly flammable material, is used 
throughout. The Grignard reagent is a chemical liquid that is so reactive that 
it can explode when exposed to water. 
Methamphetamine, an extremely potent. stimulant, is by far the most popular drug 
substance currently clandestinely manufactured. Though at least seven 
procedures have been seen. in California, only four are relatively common. 
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Senator Seymour and colleagu~s, ladies ~nd gentlemen -
Thank you for inviting me to testify today on the important 
issue of "designer drugs". I beli~le I may have. been the first 
to testify on this issue at your - original hearing, which was held 
on October 22, 1984. It is gratifying · to se~ that the level df 
attention and interest by local, state and federal aut·horities 
has gained . momentum since that time. The problem cont~nues to be 
a potentially serious and ex_plosive one, a fact tha·t I'm sure you 
are well aware of. As ._there are man) others here today who will 
be discussing -in some detail th~ principles and concepts behind 
"designer drugs", and the potential reasons for their growt_h, I 
would like to focus on ~he medical hazards as a physician and as 
the one who has had perhaps the most experience with "designer 
drugs" which cripple and maim. 
This experience began for us in 1982. At that time, I had 
neither heard of the concept of "designer drugs", nor was I aware 
that such · things were feasible. In July of 1982, we began seeing 
a series of young adults who had, literally overnight, become 
frozen and unable to move. This was a dramatic and frightening 
medical p.resentation, an.d I had never seen anything like it 
previously. · Over a period of approximately three weeks, w·e 
accumulated seven .such cases. These young people were unable to 
speak, walk, or voluntarily move. Some were · severely troubled by 
tremor. Even more remarkable, their signs and sy~ptoms resembled 
those of severe Parkinson's disease, a syndrome that we usually 
see only in aged individuals. As part of this testimony I will 
be showing a v~deotape to illustrate the condition these p~tients 
were in. - · 
The discovery of these cases, and the fact that the onlr, 
common link between ~hem was ~he use of "synthetic" oi ~new' 
heroin, set off an intensive investlgatfon to track down the 
offending agent. This effort eventually led us to the Lane 
Medical Library at Stanford to search for a 1947 paper by Albert 
Ziering and colleagues describing the synthesis of a synthetic 
narcotic which belongs to the same family as Demerol, a 
frequently used analgesic. For short, I will call this compound 
MPPP. Much to our amazement, this article had been very 
carefully razor-bladed out of the Stanford Medical Libra~y as 
were several other relevant articles. We now know that an 
individual (who we have heard holds a law degree) had done a 
careful literature search looking for a narcotic which was both 
uncontrolled (i.e, legal to possess) and easy to synthesize. 
MPPP met both of these criteria. We now know that this compound 
was synthesized in a garage laboratory and sold on the streets of 
northern California as "synthetic heroin". We further know that 
this individual eventually made a bad batch of "synthetic heroin" 
which contained almost pure MPTP, a by-product of synthesis of 
MPPP. Either too much heat or acid produces this compound which 
we now know to be one of the most potent neurotoxins ever 
described. This compound crosses into the brain and selectively 
destroys nerve cells in the brain which are responsible for 
movement. These nerve cells are located in an area called the 
substantia nigra and happen to be the very same cells which die 
in Parkinson's disease. This latter effect expla~ns why these 
patients look so much as if they had Parkinson's disease. This 
damage to the nervous system is permanent and many of these young 
people are in a rather precarious and critical condition in terms 
of management of their medical care. Further, we have now 
identified over 400 individuals who may hav~ been exposed to•this 
compound, raising the spectre of an epidemic of Parkinson's · 
disease in the future. We now spend a fair amount of time just 
trying to regulate medications of the more severely affected 
people and in attempting to locate and follow those who we think 
are at risk. 
We believe this represents the first "designer drug 
disaster", something which one might have predicted could occur 
based on the principles involved. I believe there are three 
major medical hazards to the "designer drug" approach, a 
phenomenon which we fear may spread for reasons that I'm sure you 
will be hearing repeatedly today. The first hazard relates to 
the synthesis of a new compound which is destined for human use. 
Anytime a legitimate drug company makes a new compound they are 
required to carry out studies on it in animals for years before 
taking it to humans. In the case of designer drugs, the process 
is almost instantaneous, in that after a new compound is 
synthesized the first animals to be subjected to its effects are 
human. In other words, addicts are in essence being treated as 
human guinea pigs. If these "illicit chemists" and the addicts 
are fortunate, the new compound will be ·safe, and non-toxic. 
However, there is no way of predicting when one of these new 
analogues will turn out to be a poison. Secondly, these 
laboratories never have quality controls. A legitimate 
pharmaceutical company, of course, has to carefully monitor the 
quality of the products they make. On the other hand these 
"kitchen chemists" rarely, if ever, have the analytic equipment 
available to see if their compounds are pure. This is, in fact, 
what happened with MPTP. The third major problem is the potency 
of the new "designer drugs", something I'm sure you will hear 
more in detail about from Dr. Henderson. 
I'm gratified to see these hearings being held because the 
time to act is now. Although the first "designer drug disaster" 
has indeed occurred, one can hope by taking a multi-faceted 
approach, further such problems might be avoided. 
In regard to what steps might be taken to combat this 
potentially serious social and public health ~~oblem, I would 
offer the following suggestions: 
1. The drafting of new legislation to try to remove the 
incentive of being able to -make "legal" narcotic substitutes 
has already occurred in the state of California. I would 
urge that an on~going effort be init~ated to assess the 
effect of this legislation~ so ·that ways to modify and 
improve upon what has already_ been done can take place on an · 
ongoing basis. 
2. If future medica~ hazar4s are to be addressed, a careful 
monitoring pr·ogram must be carried out. We have attempted an 
active intervention progiam usi~g an "anonymous sample" 
program, co~bined with· considerable publicity to notify 
addicts that they coqld get the drugs they're usin~ tested. 
While we have collected over _ 80 samples through this program, 
I feel that by and large it has proved an ineff~cient and 
inadequate way to fin4 out what is being sold on the streets. 
The only avenue I know at present is ~o develop and ·support 
an intensive monitorin~ program to assess the content of 
samples of drug~. Such samples could come from a co~bination 
of those garnered in arrests and drug raids, ~s- well as 
street buys. An active and .on-going· "street buy" prog-ram, 
I'm beginning to believe, is the only . way to accurately 
monitor . what new compounds are being made and sold as street 
drugs. 
Such a monitoring program should represent a statewide 
network, such that new drugs can be quickly identified and 
word transmitted throughout the state: T~is will require a 
central and sophisticated labora~ory, capable of identifying 
new compounds as well as those already discovered. 
3. Biological testing for new compounds. This laboratory 
should have the capability to carry out biological testing of 
new compounds ~o test for toxicity. Those which are ·toxic 
could quickly be identified and appropriate w~rnings could be 
posted. If another MPTP-like disaster could be avoided, the 
financial saYings c~uld : be ertormo~s • . We estimate one patient 
alone, requiring full time nursing care, could cost the'state 
between $20,000 and $30 ,-ooo pe-r year. 
4. The · development of screening procedures for well defined 
designer drugs. Once compounds were idehtified and elearly 
establfshed to be cons_tantly pr'oduced for street consumption, 
a· third responsibility of this laboratory might be to develop 
screening procedures so local authorities could easily check 
for either the compounds or their metabolites in samples and 
biological fluids. 
5. The 4evelopment of a consultation team that could respond 
immediately when new designer drug disasters are- identifi~d. 
Such a team might be comprized of a representative from a · 
toxicology laboratory, an internist, a neurologist acquainted 
with the nervous system effects of these drugs, and perhaps 
someone at the State_ level to coordinate this effort. Such a 
team could quickly respond and evaluate new designer drug 
problems. 
6. Establishing a study of the "drug designer disaster" 
which has already occurred. We are, in essence, in the 
position of dealing with the many young addicts who were 
affected or potentially affected by MPTP. We strongly 
believe a comprehensive study of precisely how this 
"epid~mic" occurred, and both the short term and long term 
consequences of such a potential health hazard, would be very 
valuable in learning to deal with future such episodes. We 
desperately need funding assistance to care for those 
patients already severely damaged as well as to identify and 
follow those who maybe at risk. The epidemiological benefit 
- of initiating such a study is that it could allow us to 
develop techniques for studying future such problems. One 
good example of this is the drug intervention program. This 
came out of the study of MPTP Parkinson patients and, I 
think, it has taught us that an active intervention program 
with anonymous sampling may be only moderately effective. 
This could save time and effort in the future. 
The foregoing represent only a preliminary set of 
suggest~ons which I hope this committee will find of some 
value in responding to the designer drug problem. Again, I 
would emphasize that a central laboratory that could monitor 
all of these problems and establish a communications network 
with local and state authorities is central to identifying 
and dealing with this problem, as well as monitoring and 
assessing the effectiveness of various forms of legislation 
which are in place or being planned to deal with this 
problem. 
Again, thank you for the opportunity of testifing for this 
committee. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. William Langston, MD 
November 5. 1 985 
----------------------------·------------------------~----------
1 wish to thank Senator Seymour and the Committee for its invitation to 
. -
participate 1n this Hearing on Clandestine Laboratories. It appears from 
looking at the witness list that you have selected people who are very 
know1edgeable and aware of the problem. In the letter I received from Senator 
Seymour, I was asked to discuss the P.C.P. problem in the Los Angeles area 
along with the export of P.C.P. through our Los Angeles International Airport. 
The P.C.P. problem in Los Angeles continues to be a major concern which a few 
years ago led us to the unfortunate title of the. P~C.P. c~pital of the United 
States. We managed to earn.this t~tle as the criminal element discovered 
~hat the necessary chemica~s to produce t·his drug were. easily ~nd legally 
purchased in our own state. What we ·were faced with then was that a person 
could, for a few hundred dollars, turn his investment ;nto thousands of dollars 
of profit without taking the normal smugglers risk of.·crossing national and 
state borders. 
In recent years .. one of the major precursors of P.C.P. was placed on the 
restricted list and most chem;cal companies discontinued its sales. The 
criminals, however, countered this move by purchasing this chemical out of 
state and then transporting it back to Los ·Angeles where business continued 
as usual. 
In Los Angeles the principal manufacturers of P.C.P. come from the ~lack areas 
of South Los Angeles and the hispani.c areas of East Los An~eles. With regards 
to South Los Angeles. we have foun~ that several loose knit organizations have 
formed to produce and sell this fonn of. death not only in Los Angeles, but to 
other cities throughout the United States. As to their method of operation, 
we have found that the people involved. once they have acquired the necessary 
chemicals. transport said chemicals to t.he more remote . are~s of Los Angeles, 
San Bernardino, Riverside and Kern Counties where they· compl~te the manu-
facturing process. Once completed, the finished product is ret1.1rned to Los 
Angeles where it is distributed to var1ous .mid-1eve1 dealers and then to the 
streets. 
( 1) . 
- The remo~e areas are used, in my opinion, for two reasons. One 1s to lessen 
the chances of discovery due to the strong chemical odors associated with the 
manufacturing process and secondly these remote areas generally receive 
minimal law enforcement. coverage. 
As to the activities of our Airport Detail at Los Angeles lnternation Airport 
as it applies to the export of P.c.P •• I am aware of four separate seizures 
of Phencyclidine so far this year. Two of these were of major violator 
significance 1n that the seizures were -of multiple gallons and were ticketed 
to cities in the east. It should be pointed out that while an ounce of P.C.P. 
sells for between one hundred and fifty to two hundred dollars in Los Angeles 
that same ounce will sell for five hundred dollars in Washington D.C. or New 
York. When P.C.P. is shipped through our airport it is generally shipped in 
glass jars or in gallon size gasoline c~ns. Recently I was told of an incident 
which occurred on an airline where a container of P.C.P. allegedly broke open 
while the plane was in flight and ~orne of the passengers experienced some of 
it•s effects. 
This Committee _s!lould-.. consider adding legislation to severely penalize any 
person found gui_lty of using a comnon carrier, airplane, train or bus to 
ship or transport P:C.P. It makes one shudder to think of the potential 
disaster which could be brought about by a spillage on board an airplane. 
At this point I would like to take a few moments to tell you a story which has 
h~d a marked impact on the P.C.P. traffic in the Los Angeles area. In the 
early part of 1985, my squad ini-tiated an investigation into the activities 
of a retail chemical company which we suspected of selling restricted chemicals 
to various illicit manufacturers of both P.C.P. and Methamphetamine. Within 
ninety days we were able to prove our suspicions were well founded. During 
this period we learned that this particular company was the largest outlet 
for five gallon containers of ether in the entire United States. Due to the 
possible far reaching effects of this investigation, we invited the California 
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (B.N.E.) and the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(D.E.A.) to join with us in this investigation. The merger and subsequent 
investigation led to obtaining a federal wire tap. The evidence obtained from 
this investigation has enabled us to close down the entire company which had 
outlets not only in Los Angeles, but in San._Bernardino and Ventura Counties. 
(2) 
For the first time in ~ twenty-five year career I have been able to see an 
impact in the trafficking of a particular drug. Since the closing of this 
company, my unit has handled only three P.C.P. lab call-outs and in one of 
the casea, the chemicals came from northern California. I am certainly not 
nai_v' en.ough to believe that we have stopped the manufacturing of P.C.P. in 
Los Angeles but for the time being we certainly have slowed it down. 
Unfortunately, as long as there 1s a demand, someone will find a way to supply 
that demand. 
During my career with the Los Angeles Police Department. J have been an 
unfortunate witness to the ruination of a large and still growing segment 
of the population of the 2nd largest city in the United States. I have 
spoken with all too many people who have lost members of their families to 
drugs including P.c.P. Believe me, anyone who says that the use of narcotics 
is a victimless crime should be made to speak to these families. 
In closing, I would like to say that through the years I have developed a 
rather jaundiced view of the California legal system, including the·1egislation 
coming out of.~~~ra~.to. It has only been very recently, with the enactment 
of the 1984 Asset Seizure Law that I have begun to think that our state 
government is beginning t~ take the drug problem seriously. However we 
all still have a long and tough road ahead. 
Gentlemen, thank you. 
Michael J. Murphy, Sergeant 
O.I.C./Cland~stine Lab Squad . 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Narcotics Division 
251 E. 6th Street 
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My name is John M. Zajac, and I am a Special Agent with the _ 
United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA). I h~ve been a Special Agent with DEA for five 
years, during _- four ~f which my primary respqnsibilit~ has been 
the investigation of clandestine drug labo~atories. I h•ve .a 
Bachelor of Science degre~ f~om San biego · s~ate University, and 
for the four years prior to becoming a Special Agent, I was a 
forensic Chemist, .also with DEA. A~ a foren~ic · Chemist and as a 
Special ·Agent; .I have participated in the in~estigation of well 
over 100 clandestine drug labo~ator.ies throughout the southwest, 
and in particular, in San Di~go County. 
According to statistics kept by the DEA Southwest Laboratory 
: here in National City, Callfornia,- in 1982 there were six clande~­
tine laboratories seized in San Diego County, in 1983 there wer~ 
three such seizures, and in 19~4 there were nine clandestine 
laboratory seizures. In 1984,-!·the San Diego field Division of 
. the Drug Enforcement Administration recogniz~d that there wa~ a 
growing problem in the San Diego area regarding clandestine drug 
laboratories. The San Diego field Division believed that the 
incr-:easing number of quasi-.).egit-imate chemica1 supply houses in 
the San Diego area would generate a~.:increase in -the availability 
of the precursor chemicals n~cess ary1;.:manu facture i 11 i cit drugs. 
In response to the situation, in early 1984 the San Diego 
field Division establlshed its-Clandestine ~aboratory Group. This 
group was a collection of DEA Special Agents and a·california 
St~te Bureau of . Narcotic Enfotcement Agent, .all with special 
expertise in clandestine labor~tory investigations. The purpose 
of this Group was to investigate the extent -of the . clandestine 
l_abor atory problem in San Diego County, to· coo rd in ate the i 11 i cit 
d"rug laboratory investi'gati've efforts of the San Diego Drug 
Enforcement Administration and the San Diego Narcotic Task force, 
and to make clandestine drug laboratory seizures in San Diego 
County. It should be noted that the Narcotic Task Force is a 
cooperative -p-oo+ing of narcotics investigators from the various 
police agericies~ in San Diego, including local, state and DEA 
narcotics agents • . This organization is co-located with the DEA 
offices in National City. As a result of the increased ·clandes-
tine laboratory investigative efforts, in federal fiscal year 
1 9 8 5 ( i. e • f r om 0 c to be r 1 , 1 9 B 4 t h rough S e ~em b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 5 ) 
forty-six illicit drug laboratories were se-i"zed in San Diego 
County. Each of these laboratories was a methamphetamine 
manufacturing operation. Evidence obtained in investigating these 
operations irrdicated that the suppliers of the precursor chemi-
cals and equipment to these_drug laboratories were the quasi-
legitimate chemical supply houses based here in San Diego County. 
1 
This brings me to the crux of the illicit drug laboratory 
problem in the San Diego area; the clandestine manufacture of 
methamphetamine. In San Diego County there are several small 
chemical supply houses - from which anyone, with no questions 
asked, can purchase illicit drug precursor chemicals. At least 
two of these chemical companies rely almost exclusively upon 
walk-in retail customers. 
To point out the magnitude of the problem, let me discuss 
the primary precursor chemical for methamphetamine as it is made 
in the San Diego area. Almost all of the clandestine meth-
amphetamine manufacturers in San Diego use a process called the 
"Ephedrine Reduction" method. Ephedrine is a precursor chemical 
which is an analog of methamphetamine. By analog I mean that the · 
chemical structure of ephedrine is almost identical of that of 
methamphetamine. By a very si~ple one-step chemical process, 
ephedrine is converted into methamphetamine. The ephedrine 
reduction method will theorectically yield an identical 
amount of methamphetamine for the amount of ephedrine used; that 
is, ~ne pound of ephedrine would yield one pound of methampheta-
mine~ The only known legitimate use for ephedrine is in pharma-
ceutical over-the-counter respiratory preparations. When so 
employed, ephedrine is used in milligram amounts. Our investi-
gation into the activities of some of these quasi-legitimate 
chemical companies has revealed that, using one of them as an 
example, over a two year period it ordered over ten thousand 
pounds of ephedrine for re-sale. This equates to ten thousand 
pounds of methamphetamine. Moreover, an employee of this same 
chemical company testified in court that all of his customers 
were walk-in customers and that the company did no outside sales. 
This chemical company has been a source of supply for precursor 
chemicals and laboratory equipment not only in San Diego and 
el~ewhere in California, but for clandestine methamphetamine 
laboratories in operations in other states as well. Large scale 
clandestine methamphetamine laboratories, and by this I mean in : 
the hundreds of~pounds, haye been seized in Oregon, Montana~ 
South Dakota, Indiana, Texas and also in Mexico. Again, each one 
of these operations was supplied by a chemical company here in 
San Diego, and again, this is just one of several 
quasi-legitimate chemical supply houses. -~ 
I would next like to discuss the evolution of the meth-
amphetamine manufacturing process here in San Diego. Years 
ago, befdre it became controlled, virtually all methamphetamine 
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was _manufactured by using the precursor chemical phenyl-2-
propanone, or P2P for short. Wheri this chemical came under 
federal and st~te control, methamp~etamine manufacturers just 
took one step backwards in the . ch~mical process. This next 
process invo 1 ved the use of the p r ·ecursor .chemical pheny 1 acetic 
acid. With phenylacetic ac~d, .a cla~destine laboratory operator 
would use one simple process to turn phenylacetic ~cid into 
phenyl-2-propanone, and then on to methamphetamine. Meanwhile, 
in the late 70s, the ephedrine reduction process was begun to be 
used here in San Diego. · By · th~ time the state had mandated the 
reporting requirement for all sales for phenylacetic acid, the 
ephedrine reduction method was in full swing in San Diego. As a 
result, quaai-legitimate ch~mical supply houses in San Diego jus 
quit selling any state reportable item, and c~ncentrated their 
sales on the ·non-reportable ch,eml.cals involved in the ephedrine· 
reductioh pracess. Today, the~e ar~ rumors amorig the clandestine 
drug laboratory u~d~rground th~t ephedrine may soon come under 
state coMtrol; and that alternative methods will have to be found 
for the clandestine m~nufacture of .methamphetamine. One of 
theae methods involves the .precursor chemical benzyl cyanide. 
Just within the last few months, we have seized twb clandestine 
laboratories in San Diego, which involve this precursor chemical. 
In the opinion of narcotic enforcement officers in San Di~go 
County, controlling individual ·precursor chemicals may be an 
effective - stop-gap measure, but it will not solve the long term 
p r o b 1 em • · A.s i s e v ide n c e d by o u r i n v est i g at i on s i n t .h i s co u n t y , 
and as is shown by the progression in various methods of meth-
amphetamine manufacture, illicit drug manufacturers will continu~ 
~o find new routes to manufacture ·their product, in order to . 
~void using · controlled precursors. In our opinion, the only way 
to control th~ clandestine laboratory situation is for the state 
to take a two _fold legislative action: first, control the 
availability of precursor ·chemical~ through th~ control of 
chemical .supply. house·; and s_econdly, control the purchasers of 
precursor chemic~ls. 
To this end~ we recommend that through the State Bureau of 
Narcotic Enforcement, the Attorney General establish a precursor 
che~ic;al "Watch Li ~ t '·'. So. as not to becom~ a bur de~ on 
leg1t1mate enterpr1ses, th1s Watch List would conta1n as few 
chemicals as possible; that is, i~ would only contain the one 
primary precursor chemical for any given illicit drug manu-
fa c t u r i n g p r o c e s s • We f u r t h e r r e co m.m en d that t h is W at c h L i s t be 
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updated every year, and that the Attorney General have author-
ization to place precursor chemicals on this Watch List on an 
emergency basis prior to the annual Watch List updating review. 
Chemical companies would then be required to obtain appropriate 
identification, preferably a state registration number ., from 
purchasers of these Watch List chemicals and furthermore, 
chemical companies would be required to report the sale of these 
chemicals to the state. Additionally, provision should be made 
to enable narcotics enforcement agencies to audit chemical 
companies' books when deemed necessary. In case it may be 
believed that a precursor Watch List and reporting require-
ment would be an unnecessary burden to levy upon chemical supply 
houses, let me point out that there are very few of these 
quasi-legitimate supply houses which even deal in precursor 
chemicals. Specifically, let me quote three legitimate chemical 
supply houses here in San Diego County which have in the past 
routinely cooperated with us regarding the sale of watch list 
type precursor chemicals. When presented with a list of chem-
ical~, one of the companies told us that they do not sell those 
chemicals, nor would they ever sell them because "only drug 
dealers buy them". Another company told us that they had not 
sold any of those listed chemicals because of problems of selling 
to retail customers ''particularly drug dealers". The third 
company told us that they did not sell to retail customers, and 
that if one of their business customers wanted to purchase any of 
those watch list chemicals and could not show a legitimate use 
for those chemicals, then that business would be required 
to obtain DEA permission to purchase those watch list chemicals. 
Contrasting this, when DEA went to one of the quasi-legitimate 
Chemical companies in an attempt to gain their cooperation, an 
employee of that company immediately telephoned the company's 
attorney, and was told by that attorney that he was orde~ing the 
employees "not to cooperate with the government". 
The seconq_approach we see toward controlling the illicit 
manufacture of ~rugs in California is to ~ontrol the purchasers 
of precursor chemicals. We see this step as necessary because we 
have been finding more and more, that clandestine laboratory 
operators have been using what we call "runners" to obtain their 
chemicals for them. These runners may or ~y not know of the 
existence of the illicit dryg laboratory, and may or may not be 
willing participants in the operation. We have found that some 
of these runners were teenagers, or elderly men and women, who 
are asked by their friend (and unbeknownst laboratory operator) 
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to run an errand. The errand would usually be to go to a 
chemical supply house and pick up an order. The runner would then 
be pai~ $50.00 to $200.00 for doing this favor. By controlling, 
through registration, 'who may purchase the highly specialized 
chemicals on a Watch . List, we may control the distribution of 
precursor chemicals throughout the state. This registration 
would not be overly burdensome on legitimate consumers of the 
specialized use precursor chemicals. For instance·, the only 
legitimate use for ephedrine· is in pharmaceutical preparations. 
Since most pharmaceutical companies are already registrants for 
moie stringently controlled substances, this registration is 
nothing more than the registration which they already have 
any-way. Additionally, legitimate business enterprises who have 
need for Watch · List type ch emi c:al s would not buy them from lac al 
small businesses. As we have fb~nd in our investigation into the 
national distribution of ephedrine_, legitimate consumers of this 
chemical buy it in bulk from national distributors, at wholesale 
prices. 
lastly, we have a suggestion regarding the environmental 
hazards posed by clandestine drug laboratories. It is virtually 
unknown to seize an illicit drug manufacturing operation where 
waste products are properly disposed. Furthermore, at any 
clandestine drug iaboratory site, there are always a myriad of 
hazardous chemicals present. As a matter of public safety, we 
routinely pay for a hazardous waste disposal company to c~me to 
the site and dispose of these chemicals. A single disposal 
operation may cost the government thousands of dollars. It is 
our recommendation that as part of sentencing, clandestine 
laboratory operators be required to reimburse the government for 
the cost of the clean up. 
In conclusion, we believe that the measures outlined above, 
should enable na_rcotics enforcem~nt agencies to gain significant 
control of the cilandestine drug laboratory problem in California. 
A chemical Watch List, coupled with mandatory ch~mical company 
cooperation, would control the availability of illicit drug 
precursors in California. The registration of precursor chemical 
consumers, along with significant sanctions~or possession of 
precursors without registration, would have the additional 
benefit of aiding in contral·' af precursor chemicals purchased out 
of state, and brought ·into California for the purpose of 
manufacturing illicit drugs • . 
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Senator Seymour, Committee Members, 
. . 
My name is Karen Dallosta and I am ·representing the Western States Information 
Network, commonly referred to by it$ acronym, WSIN. _ WSIN is a federally funded 
multi-state narcotic intelligence agency. My duties there include maintaining intelligence 
information on clandestine drug manuf~cturers. In 1983, at the request of Attorney 
General .Van de Kamp, I began keeping statistical data on the number and types of 
clandestine drug laboratories that ·were seized .in California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska 
and Hawaii. The Drug Enforcement Admin~tration was the only agency gathering 
statistics on illicit labs. Problems were encountered while gathering this information 
such as defining wha_t a clandestine drug laboratory is and dealing with lack of voluntary 
reporting. Neither of these p~obl~ms has been satisfactorily resolv~d. DEA has set up 
-a classification s_ystem as a guideline for the definition of what is and· what is not a 
laboratory, using -terms such as operational, dismantled, in storage and in production. 
WSIN has no set definition for a clE.mdestine laboratory but generally require that a 
seized laboratory must be operational or in· production to be counted. In other words, 
there must be both chemicals and equipment used to manufacture controlled substances -
at the laboratory site. We use this definition to avoid double reporting. For example, 
if chemicals are found in a storage shed and chemicals and glassware are found in a 
house, this is considered one laboratory. 
WSIN relies on voluntary reporting by local, ~tate and federal agenci~s that seize 
laboratories. Additionally we coordinate with the Federal ·Drug Enforcement 
Administration and the California Attorney .Ge~eral's B·ureau of Narcotic Enforcement 
and Bureau of Forensic Services. We also subscribe to a newspaper clipping service 
which provides additional information on the. number of clandestin.e laboratories seized. 
This information is entered in a computer and the data is then examined for trends 
which can be used in an investigativ~ - fashio_n. Although some lack of reporting is 
inevitable and actual numbers may vary slightly, the figures are consistent with trends 
reported by Federal, State and local agencies nationwide. This y·ear to date, WSIN has 
received reports of 175 clandestine drug laboratories seized in California. This is over 
three times the number of laboratories reported seized in 1980. Most sources agree 
that there are two to three operational clandestine laboratories for every one lab that 
is shut down. Not only are there more laboratories being discovered each year in 
California, but the average laboratory is producing more drugs at a much higher purity 
level. Methamphetamine is a good example of this trend. In 1983, the average meth 
laboratory produced an estimated 11 pounds a week, in 1984, the figure increased to 
16 pounds a week and this year, the average methamphetamine laboratory produces 24 
pounds of finished product each week. The illicit chemists that are running these labs 
are becoming more experienced and sophisticated, occasionaly holding advanced college 
degrees in chemistry! Additionally, new techniques and chemical formulas that don't 
require the use of reportable precursors are making it more difficult to catch these 
chemists. This is especially true in Southern California where the majority of 
methamphetamine laboratories use ephedrine as the essential precursor chemical. 
Ephedrine yields a high quality product without some of the odors that have traditionally 
been associated with methamphetamine manufacture. Since ephedrine can be sold 
legally and without reporting sales to the California Attorney General's Office, many 
chemical companies sell ephedrine to illicit laboratory operators for inflated prices .• 
Legitimately, ephedrine sells for $15.00 to $20.00 per pound. However, methamphetamine 
manufacturers pay up to $175.00 per pound. Chemical companies that knowingly sell 
to clandestine laboratory operators are getting rich off of their business. 
Statistically, we can even give a profile of an average methamphetamine manufacturer. 
He is a white male and may be well educated or has spent time learning chemistry 
from an experienced cooker. Often times, this chemistry lesson takes place in prison 
where formulas and techniques are passed around between inmates. He may have ties 
. to outlaw motorcycle gangs who will provide him with precursor chemicals, protection 
and a ready market · for the finished product. This cooker will pick an isolated area for 
his laboratory, where the threat from law enforcement is usually the least. This week 
he will make approximately 24 pounds of high quality methamphetamine which he will 
sell for about $500,000.00! 
Phencyclidine or PCP laboratories are also increasing at a pheonomenal rate. To date, 
there have been twice as many PCP laboratories· seized this year· than for all .of 1984. 
' ' . 
Each laboratory on the average produces thre~ and · a half times more PCP than last 
year. This means that approximately seven times more· PCP is now reacning the street 
from illicit laboratories. Ttle average PCP manufacturer is a black male. He will 
often use a three step formula and complete each part in a different location. 
Frequently, he will use motel rooms or urban area houses. This is extremely unfortunate 
because PCP precursor chemicals are among the most toxic chemicals used in illicit 
laboratories. They include two chemicals which, if mixed together, will form deadly 
cyanide gas. Occasionally, the PCP cooker will dump waste from his laboratory on 
the gound in an is.olated area, contaminating the environment. This week he will make 
24 gallons of PCP -and sell this dangerous liquid for approxi~ately $2.50,000.00 • . 
The picture doesn~t get any brighter when you consider the ·other drugs that are produced 
daily in California. Seizures this year to date include seven cocaine labs, one 
methaqualone lab, two hash oil labs and two fentanyl labs. F~ in excess of 100 million 
dollars worth of these drugs have been produced · in California already this year. 
California has the dubious distinction of being the soQrce state for one of the most 
dangerous drugs known to man, fentanyl. Although this is the first year that a fentanyl 
laboratory has been seized, it appears inevitable that synthetic opiates such as fentanyl 
will continue to gain popularity due to -the questionable legality and high profit margin 
associated with the manufacture of designer drugs. The final and oft_en overlooked 
problem associated with clandestine drug laboratories is the amount of hazardous waste 
that must be disposed of. Law enforcement officers are required by law to properly 
package and dispose of all hazardous waste. This. amounts to a tremendous monetary 
. burden on local agencies who do not budget for this unexpected expense. -So far this 
year 274 drums of hazardous waste have been removed from clandestine laboratories 
in Northern California at a cost in excess of $45,000.00. In 1984, the Attorney General's 
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement spent $39,000.00 on the removal and disposal of 
potentially hazardous laboratory waste. Additionally, BNE is taxed by the State Board 
of Equalization as a generator of hazardous waste. Unfortunately, the estimated 400 
operational laboratories that are not seized do not follow the rules for waste disposal. 
Sludge from these labs is often dumped in open fields or in lakes and streams where 
contamination will remain for years. 
As you ·can see, the clandestine laboratory problem is growing at a tremendous rate. 
In the last five years, DEA has reported the seizure of 1181 clandestine ch-ug laboratories 
nationwide. California has accounted for 2596 of those reported seizures. In the first 
ten months of this year there have been 7596 more labs reported seized. And these 
laboratories are much larger than those seen in the past. What this means is that . 
California is rapidly establishing itself as the producer of domestically manufactured 
controlled substances. Obviously additional legislation, resources and manpower are 
needed to combat this ever-increasing and potentially lethal problem. 
Mr. Chairman, members, I am honored to have been invited to speak before this 
Committee, I hope that my comments have been helpful and I would now be happy to 
answer any questions you may have. 
